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INTRODUCTION 
The first time I remember being sexually harassed at work was at my second 
job ever, working at a bookstore. There was a man there who always tried 
to work sexual innuendo into every conversation we had. He’d find excuses 
to touch my back or arm, and try to give me massages in the breakroom. He 
was constantly winking at me, licking his lips. He would bring a gym bag 
to work, and sometimes, when we were in the breakroom together, he’d 
unpack the bag like he was organizing it. He’d talk to me about his workout 
routine, how important it was for him to stay in shape so he could maintain 
his sexual prowess. Then he’d bring out a bottle of KY Jelly, and he’d 
slowly and deliberately place it on the table. Staring at me. 
Sometimes managers would be in the room, pretending not to hear. 
Occasionally a manager would shake their head at him and tsk tsk, like he 
was a naughty child. He was not a child. He was 32. I, on the other hand, 
was a child. I was 17.1  
- Ijeoma Oluo 
                                                   
 1. See Ijeoma Oluo, Due Process Is Needed for Sexual Harassment 
Accusations—But For Whom?, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2017), https://medium.com/the-
establishment/due-process-is-needed-for-sexual-harassment-accusations-but-for-
whom-968e7c81e6d6 [https://perma.cc/28M4-T9DW]. 
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Typically social norms change slowly. In the late 1990s, when 
Ijeoma Oluo was seventeen,2 sexual harassment was seen as a “tsking” 
matter: Only 34% of Americans thought it was a serious problem.3 
Then came Alyssa Milano’s #MeToo tweet on October 15, 2017, 
which was retweeted over a million times across eighty-five 
countries.4 Almost immediately, the percentage of Americans who 
believe that sexual harassment is a serious problem shot up to 
64%.5 By late 2017, roughly 75% of Americans believed that sexual 
harassment and assault were “very important” issues for the country.6 
That is a norm cascade.  
The assumption that sexual harassment reflects nothing more 
than individual misbehavior is changing as well. Two-thirds (66%) of 
Americans now say that recent allegations of sexual harassment 
“mainly reflect widespread problems in society,” with only 28% 
attributing them mainly to individual misconduct.7 The view that 
sexual harassment results from a climate of permission created or 
                                                   
 2. See id. 
 3. Juana Summers & Jennifer Agiesta, CNN Poll: 7 in 10 Americans Say 
Sexual Harassment Is a Very Serious Problem, CNN (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/sexual-harassment-poll/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XKW-TN7H] (presenting information on Americans’ views on 
sexual harassment with data collected in May 1998 and December 2017). A PDF of 
full poll results is also available. See CNN December 2017, SSRS (Dec. 22, 2017), 
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2017/images/12/21/rel12d.-.sexual.harassment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8W37-A8PH]. 
 4. Andrea Park, #MeToo Reaches 85 Countries with 1.7M Tweets, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-reaches-85-countries-
with-1-7-million-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/H2JY-NTZT]. We note that prior to the 
proliferation of #MeToo tweets, in 2007, Tarana Burke founded her nonprofit, Just 
Be Inc., for helping victims of sexual violence and coining her movement “Me Too.” 
See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.amp.html 
[https://perma.cc/4ZTS-9BYX].  
 5. Gary Langer, Unwanted Sexual Advances Not Just a Hollywood, 
Weinstein Story, Poll Finds, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/unwanted-sexual-advances-hollywood-weinstein-story-poll/story?id= 
50521721 [https://perma.cc/9UEY-7N8D]. 
 6. Baxter Oliphant, Women and Men in Both Parties Say Sexual 
Harassment Allegations Reflect ‘Widespread Problems in Society’, PEW RESEARCH 
(Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/07/americans-views-
of-sexual-harassment-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/4TDS-WG94]. 
 7. Id. 
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tolerated by an employer, formerly confined to feminist theorists, 
suddenly seems mainstream.8  
This Article began in reaction to a panel on sexual harassment 
presented to federal judges, in which a defense attorney included a 
squib on Brooks v. City of San Mateo from a past continuing legal 
education program she conducted.9 During a call to prepare for the 
program, which included Professor Joan Williams and other members 
of the panel, joshing ensued as the employment attorneys kidded each 
other about what they all called the “one free grab” case. This led 
Professor Williams to look more closely at the details. 
The plaintiff, 911 dispatcher Patricia Brooks, worked out of the 
police station in a city just south of San Francisco.10 While Brooks was 
on a 911 call, a senior dispatcher, Steven Selvaggio, put his hand on 
her stomach and commented on its softness and sexiness.11 Brooks told 
Selvaggio to stop touching her and forcefully pushed him away.12 
“Perhaps taking this as encouragement,” wrote Judge Alex Kozinski 
for the Ninth Circuit, Selvaggio trapped Brooks against her desk while 
she was on another call and put his hand “underneath her sweater and 
bra to fondle her bare breast.”13 Brooks removed his hand and told him 
he had “crossed a line,” to which Selvaggio responded that she needn’t 
worry about cheating on her husband because he would “do 
everything.”14 Selvaggio then approached Brooks “as if he would 
fondle her breasts again.”15 “Fortunately,” noted the Court, “another 
dispatcher arrived at this time, and Selvaggio ceased his behavior.”16 
Brooks reported Selvaggio, and the subsequent investigation revealed 
that “at least” two female coworkers experienced similar treatment.17 
Nonetheless, Judge Kozinski found no sexual harassment on the 
grounds that the harassment was not severe.18 This conclusion is hard 
to understand given that Selvaggio spent 120 days in jail after pleading 
                                                   
 8. See generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual 
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong 
with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). 
 9. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 10. See id. at 921. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 922. 
 18. See id. at 926. 
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no contest to criminal sexual assault for the same incident.19 How can 
an incident severe enough to land someone in jail be insufficiently 
severe to sustain a civil suit for sexual harassment? Is it reasonable to 
require women to endure criminal sexual assault as a condition of 
employment?  
Relatively little has been written about sexual harassment in law 
reviews for the past decade.20 Catharine MacKinnon’s foundational 
Sexual Harassment of Working Women was published in 1979.21 After 
the Supreme Court’s landmark case of Meritor Savings Banks v. 
Vinson22 in 1986, the number of law review articles increased steadily 
throughout the 1990s.23 The number of articles peaked in 1999, with 
177 published that year.24 The volume of law review writing on sexual 
harassment began to fall thereafter, declining sharply after 2001, and 
it has continued to decline until very recently.25 
This Article returns to the topic and asks whether Brooks v. San 
Mateo and four other appellate hostile-environment sexual harassment 
cases that have each been cited more than 500 times remain good 
                                                   
 19. See id. at 921. 
 20. To gauge the volume of law review literature on sexual harassment over 
the years, we ran a search on Westlaw of the term “sexual harassment” and filtered by 
secondary sources and then “law reviews and journals,” and then counted the number 
of articles per year with sexual harassment as the main topic from 1988 to 2018. 
Articles counted were those that either had sexual harassment as their main topic or 
discussed the subject in some significant way; articles that only contained the term 
“sexual harassment” but that did not discuss the topic were not counted. 
 21. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN (Yale Univ. Press 1979). 
 22. See Meritor Savings Banks v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  
 23. Some important articles published during this early period include: 
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
1169 (1998) (describing early case law); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination 
and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (arguing 
that sexually oriented behavior undercuts women’s ability to be seen as credible 
colleagues); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 691 (1997) (finding that sexual harassment is a “technology of sexism” that 
serves to police men into heteronormative masculinity and women into 
heteronormative femininity); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 
107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment, particularly in blue-collar 
jobs, often is not sexual but is designed to drive women out of coveted jobs). 
 24. See supra note 20. 
 25. The number of articles declined to 106 in the year 2000; eighty in the 
year 2001; and fifty-seven in 2002. The downward trend continued through the 2000s, 
with an average of sixty-three articles per year between 2000–2004 and thirty-seven 
articles per year between 2005–2009. Even less was written in the 2010s, with an 
average of sixteen articles per year between 2010–2017. Starting in 2018, the number 
has increased, with fifty-four articles as of December 10, 2018.  
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precedent in the light of the norm cascade precipitated and represented 
by #MeToo.26 Our analysis is designed to interrupt what we call the 
“infinite regression of anachronism,” or the tendency of courts to rely 
on cases that reflect what was thought to be reasonable ten or twenty 
years ago, forgetting that what was reasonable then might be different 
from what a reasonable person or jury would likely think today.27 
These anachronistic cases entrench outdated norms, foreclosing an 
assessment of what is reasonable now. To interrupt this infinite 
regression, this Article pays close attention to the facts of the cases-
in-chief discussed below to enable the reader, and the courts, to 
reassess whether a reasonable person and a reasonable jury would be 
likely to find sexual harassment today.  
To illustrate this infinite regression, this Article also discusses 
other cases that cite the five cases-in-chief, which we call the “sub-
cases.”28 The sub-cases show how the cases-in-chief use the infinite 
regression of anachronism to ratchet up the standard for what 
constitutes a hostile environment in their circuit. Both the cases-in-
chief and the sub-cases reflect an era when sexual harassment was not 
taken seriously. They are no longer valid as precedent in an era in 
which 86% of Americans endorse a “zero-tolerance” policy toward 
sexual harassment.29  
It goes without saying that changes in public opinion do not 
automatically change the validity of legal precedent. Yet sexual 
harassment is a special case because “reasonableness” plays a central 
                                                   
 26. On Westlaw, the search term used was the West Key Number 78k1185. 
On Ravel Law, we searched for the phrase “hostile work environment” within the 
same paragraph as [severe OR pervasive]. Then we chose the three most cited cases 
in each circuit, from which we chose five that were most inconsistent with post-
#MeToo norms. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000); Mendoza v. Borden, 
Inc., 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 
F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1999); Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
 27. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What 
Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 
817-19 (2002) [hereinafter Beiner 2002]. 
 28. “Sub-cases” were located using the “citing references” function on 
Westlaw, which provides a list of all cases which cite a case-in-chief. The authors 
read the cases on these lists and selected as sub-cases those which relied on the cases-
in-chief to reach a result which they feel is inconsistent with what a reasonable jury 
would likely find today. 
 29. Chris Jackson, American Attitudes on Sexual Harassment, IPSOS (Dec. 
15, 2017), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/npr-sexual-harassment-2017-12-
14 [https://perma.cc/7QPV-JST2].  
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role in both procedural and substantive ways. Procedurally, the typical 
sexual harassment case presents as a summary judgment motion by 
the employer, where the question for the judge is whether a 
“reasonable” jury could find for the plaintiff after making all factual 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 
Reasonableness is also key in the substantive law. Hostile work 
environment cases—which constitute the lion’s share of sexual 
harassment cases—require courts to assess whether the hostility was 
severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, 
considering “all the circumstances.”30 The norm cascade around 
sexual harassment in the wake of #MeToo is relevant both to whether 
a reasonable jury might find that sexual harassment occurred and 
regarding what constitutes an objectively hostile work environment 
from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position. 
Reasonableness enters into sexual harassment cases in a third 
way too. Employers long have used non-disclosure agreements 
(NDAs) to prevent employees from revealing sexual harassment they 
experienced in the workplace.31 Indeed, NDAs kept many harassment 
survivors silent for years before #MeToo emboldened them to speak 
out.32 NDAs executed in the employment context are enforceable only 
to the extent that they are “reasonable”33 based on a weighing of the 
employer’s interest in secrecy, the employee’s interest in disclosure, 
and the public interest in disclosure.34 The norm cascade provides 
evidence of the strong public interest in the disclosure of sexual 
harassment and is thus relevant to whether NDAs that prohibit 
disclosure of sexual harassment can be reasonably enforced.  
The central role of reasonableness pivots the norm cascade 
directly into sexual harassment law. Whereas smoking at work was 
widely seen as reasonable and unobjectionable several decades ago, a 
                                                   
 30. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).  
 31. See Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of 
Workplace Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2017/10/legal-agreements-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/ 
[https://perma.cc/GQM4-APBP]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See, e.g., CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, 306 F. Supp. 3d 857, 880 (S.D. W. Va. 
2018) (holding a confidentiality agreement as void because it was unreasonable, 
containing no limitation of time or geographic scope); Spirax Sarco, Inc. v. SSI Eng’g, 
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 408, 427 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (requiring NDAs to be 
“reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”). 
 34. See, e.g., Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
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rule allowing on-the-job smoking today is now unthinkable. Just as 
one would not cite outdated smoking rules to support a conclusion 
about what’s reasonable at work today, it makes little sense to cite 
outdated sexual harassment rulings that reflect very different notions 
of reasonable workplace behavior than exist today in the light of 
#MeToo.  
This Article is designed to help judges fulfill their role in a very 
complex cultural environment. Competently written defense briefs 
will inevitably characterize the cases-in-chief in ways that sound 
innocuous. This Article seeks to ensure that judges who might be 
inclined to rely on these oft-cited cases today are fully aware of the 
factual contexts in which a prior court held that no reasonable person 
or jury could find sexual harassment. Even judges who felt confident 
that they knew what was reasonable in the past should not assume they 
know what Americans believe is reasonable today. Those judges 
should be more inclined to let juries decide what’s reasonable now.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the traditional 
framework governing sexual harassment law.35 Part II uses polling 
data to document the norm cascade.36 Part III reassesses five of the 
most-often cited circuit court sexual harassment cases in the light of 
the norm cascade and the norm cascade’s influence on what a jury 
would find reasonable today.37 Part IV examines what is reasonable in 
the context of enforcing NDAs against plaintiffs.38 We conclude by 
pointing out that judges may soon face an avalanche of opportunities 
to reflect on the impact of the norm cascade on sexual harassment 
law.39 This Article is designed to help them navigate that challenge. 
I. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Sexual harassment was first recognized as a cause of action for 
illegal workplace discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 in Meritor v. Vinson.40 The Court held in Meritor that 
“Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free 
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”41 and that 
employers cannot require workers to “run a gauntlet of sexual abuse 
                                                   
 35. See infra Part I. 
 36. See infra Part II. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. See infra Part IV. 
 39. See infra Part V. 
 40. See generally Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 41. Id. at 65.  
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in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a 
living.”42 The Court continued: “[F]or sexual harassment to be 
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the 
conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”43  
Reasonableness entered the hostile-work-environment equation 
in the 1993 case Harris v. Forklift, where the Supreme Court held that 
to state a valid claim, a plaintiff needs to prove “an objectively hostile 
or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable 
person would find hostile or abusive.”44 Harris overturned a lower 
court decision that held that, although an employer’s sexual and sexist 
statements offended the plaintiff and would offend a reasonable 
woman, no hostile environment was proven because the statements 
were not “so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [the 
plaintiff’s] psychological well-being.”45 Noting that the hostile 
environment test was not “mathematically precise,” the Supreme 
Court explained that it could be determined “only by looking at all the 
circumstances,” which “may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 
it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”46 
While psychological harm can be taken into account like any other 
relevant factor, “no single factor is required.”47 As we will see below, 
some courts have inexplicably turned this language into a requirement 
that no behavior constitutes sexual harassment unless it is physically 
threatening.48  
In Oncale v. Sundowner in 1998, the Court again held that the 
environment must be one that “a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position”49 would find hostile in light of all circumstances, including 
“the social context in which [the] behavior occurs and is experienced 
by [the] target.”50 Thus the plaintiff must prove that the harassing 
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive that a reasonable person 
                                                   
 42. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 
1982)).  
 43. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).  
 44. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 45. Id. at 20, 23. 
 46. Id. at 22, 23. 
 47. Id.  
 48. See infra Sections III.B, III.C, III.D, III.E. 
 49. Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 50. Id. 
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would feel it altered the conditions of employment, considering the 
evidence as a whole and with due consideration to social context.51  
Reasonableness also is embedded in the relevant procedural 
standard, given the typical procedural posture of these cases. In every 
one of the five cases-in-chief discussed in this Article, judges took the 
case away from a jury, either by affirming a grant of summary 
judgment for the employer or by granting judgment as a matter of law 
after the trial was completed.52 In both procedural contexts, judges 
may exclude the jury only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could not find for the plaintiff after making all factual inferences in 
their favor.53 Thus, in each of the five main cases, as in all hostile 
environment sexual harassment cases, courts should be deciding 
whether a reasonable jury could have found that a reasonable person 
would have considered what happened sexual harassment. We refer to 
these two standards collectively as the “Harris reasonableness 
standard” or simply the “reasonableness standard.”  
Removing cases from juries raises fundamental fairness issues 
in any context, but these issues are particularly acute in the context of 
sexual harassment cases. The judges in the cases-in-chief made 
decisions about what they thought a reasonable jury could find at a 
moment in time when norms about sexual harassment were very 
different, typically in the late 1990s. Even if they were right then, the 
recent sharp shift in social norms surrounding sexual harassment 
provides strong evidence that reasonable juries would think differently 
today.  
II. THE NORM CASCADE 
Cass Sunstein coined the term “norm cascade” in 1996.54 
Sunstein pointed out that norm cascades occur when societies 
                                                   
 51. See id. (providing that social context is a relevant consideration); Harris, 
510 U.S. at 21 (defining a hostile work environment as “an environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive”); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (“For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be 
sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment 
and create an abusive working environment.’”). 
 52. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary 
Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007). 
 53. Id. Given that the overwhelming proportion of sexual harassment cases 
are brought by women against men, we will use the pronouns “she” and “her” to refer 
to the person alleging sexual harassment for reasons of grammatical simplicity. 
 54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 909 (1996).  
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experience sharp shifts in social norms and cited feminism and the 
anti-apartheid movements as examples.55 The term “norm cascade”—
popularized by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 
Article “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”—has 
been most commonly used in the academic field of international 
relations.56 Finnemore and Sikkink describe norms as having a life 
cycle that consists of “norms emergence” followed by a “norm 
cascade” and then “internalization.”57 The first stage involves “norms 
entrepreneurs,” who attempt to convince a critical mass of actors to 
embrace new norms.58 The cascade begins following a tipping point 
where a critical mass adopts the new norm, after which the norm 
becomes internalized and no longer a matter of broad public debate.59 
Evidence that #MeToo has prompted a norm cascade comes 
from three different kinds of polls.60 The most compelling kind of data 
compares polls taken before #MeToo with those taken afterwards. The 
second kind of data simply reports the overwhelming agreement 
among the American public that sexual harassment is a serious 
problem. The third kind of data compares what people believe is the 
impact of the norm cascade rather than providing direct evidence of 
what that impact is. Questions in polls of this kind ask people to 
compare their understanding of what norms were in the recent past 
with what norms are today. Combining these three types of data 
provides a vivid picture of the contours of norm cascade. In effect, it 
represents five related shifts. 
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A. New Norm #1: Sexual Harassment is a Serious Problem 
Widespread agreement exists today that sexual harassment is 
serious. In the late 1990s, only 34% of Americans believed that sexual 
harassment was a serious problem,61 but today, around 75% do.62 In 
1998, a majority of Americans said that people were too sensitive 
about sexual harassment; shortly after the #MeToo tweet, a majority 
said that workplaces are not sensitive enough to sexual harassment.63 
Americans also seem to believe others are taking sexual harassment 
more seriously today.64 Two-thirds (66%) of Americans believe that 
reports of sexual harassment were generally ignored five years ago; 
only 26% of Americans believe they are ignored now.65 Additionally, 
Americans now recognize that men are sexually harassed too.66 
The consensus that sexual harassment is a serious problem is 
strongest among younger people.67 Americans under thirty years old 
are more likely than those fifty or older to view sexual harassment as 
a serious problem.68 Another poll found that two-thirds (66%) of 
Americans sixty-five or older say that heightened attention to sexual 
harassment has made navigating workplace interactions more difficult 
for men.69 Only 42% of Americans under age thirty agree.70 Judges—
who are more likely to be over fifty than under thirty—should keep 
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this in mind when assuming that they know what reasonable 
Americans believe today.  
B. New Norm #2: Broad Agreement Exists About What Behaviors 
Constitute Sexual Harassment 
The traditional assumption was that one should be wary of 
labeling problematic behavior as “harassment” because different 
people (particularly people of different genders) interpret the same 
behaviors differently. What is harassment to one person might just be 
horseplay or flirting to another. This view was well expressed by 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence in Harris v. Forklift,71 which 
warned that that law “lets virtually unguided juries decide whether 
sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is 
egregious enough” to be considered sexual harassment.72 Scalia’s 
language likely encouraged federal judges to take summary judgment 
cases away from these “largely unguided” juries.  
If this worry was well justified when Justice Scalia expressed it 
in 1993, it is no longer so today. Widespread agreement exists (among 
96% of women and 86% of men) that touching or groping is sexual 
harassment.73 There are similar levels of consensus that sexual 
harassment includes: being forced to do something sexual (91% of 
women; 83% of men); masturbating in front of someone (89% of 
women; 76% of men); exposing oneself (89% of women; 76% of 
men); sharing intimate photos without permission (85% of women; 
71% of men); and sending sexually explicit texts or emails (83% of 
women; 69% of men).74 There is even strong agreement that verbal 
comments alone can constitute harassment: 86% of women and 70% 
of men believe that making sexual comments about someone’s looks 
or body is sexual harassment.75  
These findings highlight not only that strong consensus exists 
about what kinds of behaviors constitute sexual harassment but also 
that the consensus cuts across gender lines. Men and women now 
largely agree that people are entitled to show up to work and be treated 
as colleagues, not as sexual targets or opportunities. Sexual 
                                                   
 71. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993).  
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 73. The Behaviors Americans Count as Sexual Harassment, BARNA (Nov. 
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harassment—certainly if it involves groping, touching, or sexual 
ridicule—is now viewed as aberrant behavior that most Americans, of 
all genders, consider inappropriate.  
C. New Norm #3: Employers Should Not Tolerate Sexual 
Harassment 
The old norm was that employers should not be held responsible 
for the sexual antics of their employees and that women should “suck 
it up” if they felt they had been harassed and should not go running to 
Human Resources for help.76 When Professor Williams entered the 
workforce in the 1980s, she was told that sexual harassment was 
something that any woman worth her salt could handle on her own and 
that if she could not, she did not belong in the workforce. This is the 
norm that has perhaps changed most dramatically. Eighty-six percent 
of Americans now endorse a “zero-tolerance” policy, not necessarily 
meaning that a harasser should be fired but that harassing behavior 
should not be excused or tolerated.77  
D. New Norm #4: Sexual Harassment Accusers Are Credible 
Before #MeToo, women who complained about sexual 
harassment were often stereotyped as vengeful, lying sluts.78 Thus in 
1992, one senator asked Anita Hill, “Aren’t you just a scorned 
woman?” and she was famously called “a little bit nutty and a little bit 
slutty” by David Brock.79 This stereotype was used to compromise 
Anita Hill’s credibility, career, and dignity after she testified at the 
confirmation hearings of now-Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas.80  
In a stunning reversal, less than a third (31%) of Americans now 
think that false accusations of sexual harassment are a major 
                                                   
 76. This “old norm” is based on the authors’ own workplace experiences. 
Such experiences were representative of commonly held beliefs.  
 77. Jackson, supra note 29. 
 78. See Joan C. Williams & Suzanne Lebsock, Now What?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://hbr.org/cover-story/2018/01/now-what 
 [https://perma.cc/RWD5-AUWE]. 
 79. Margaret Carlson, Smearing Anita Hill: A Writer Confesses, TIME (July 
9, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,167355,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/E2GQ-LQ68]; Williams & Lebsock, supra note 78. David Brock 
later recanted. 
 80. See Carlson, supra note 79. 
154 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
problem.81 Sixty-four percent of American workers say the accuser is 
more likely than the accused to be believed at their workplaces—69% 
of women and 60% of men.82 At the same time, judges worried about 
false accusations can take comfort in the fact that 77% of Americans 
believe that both the accuser and the accused should get the benefit of 
the doubt until proven otherwise in sexual harassment cases.83 
III. FIVE OFT-CITED CIRCUIT COURT CASES DO NOT REFLECT 
WHAT REASONABLE PEOPLE AND JURIES WOULD LIKELY BELIEVE 
TODAY ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT  
The norm cascade has obvious implications for sexual 
harassment law. As discussed above, sexual harassment is grounded 
in reasonableness, both substantively and procedurally.84 In Harris v. 
Forklift, the Court clarified that the “severe or pervasive” requirement 
in Meritor must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable 
person: “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment 
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond 
Title VII’s purview.”85  
Reasonableness standards are meant to build flexibility and 
continuous updating into the law, not to entrench norms from another 
time. Yet many courts have failed to update their understandings of 
reasonableness and instead rely on cases reflecting standards of 
reasonableness from the last century. To provide a corrective, this 
Article highlights aspects of widely cited cases that are substantially 
out of step with prevailing, widely held norms about sexual 
harassment—for instance, the finding that a reasonable person would 
not find conduct amounting to criminal sexual assault sufficiently 
severe to constitute a hostile work environment. We also pay close 
attention to whether courts create heightened standards for sexual 
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harassment that reflect the outdated norm that run-of-the-mill sexual 
harassment is just not that serious. Our findings, presented below, will 
help to ensure that judges are equipped to properly apply sexual 
harassment law in a changed and rapidly evolving social and cultural 
environment. 
A. The Ninth Circuit: Brooks v. San Mateo and its Progeny 
1. Brooks v. San Mateo 
The 2000 case Brooks v. San Mateo has been cited 1,296 times.86 
Brooks was an appeal from a summary judgment for the city of San 
Mateo, so the relevant standard was whether a reasonable jury, taking 
all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, could find that Brooks had 
reasonably perceived her work environment to be hostile.87 As 
summarized above, Brooks involved a 911 dispatcher whose coworker 
cornered her, groped her stomach, put his hand up her dress, and 
“fondled” (the court’s word) her bare breast—all against her 
protestations and while she was attempting to handle emergency 
calls.88  
Judge Kozinski conceded that Brooks herself perceived her work 
environment to be hostile, but he found that she failed to fulfill the 
additional requirement that the environment be seen as hostile to a 
reasonable person.89 He did not mention the relevant standard for 
granting the employer’s summary judgment motion: that no 
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.90 His opinion in Brooks 
reflects three outdated norms: (1) that groping is not necessarily sexual 
harassment; (2) that workplace sexual harassment is not serious, even 
up to and including sexual assault; and (3) that employers should not 
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be held responsible for the sexual antics of their employees and 
women should just “suck it up” and learn to handle the harassment (as 
at least two women had done before Brooks complained, as noted in 
the Introduction).  
Under Oncale, reasonableness is judged from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.91 Given that 96% of 
American women and 86% of men consider “touching or groping” to 
be sexual harassment, the reasonable person and jury today would be 
highly likely to see stomach stroking and breast fondling as sexual 
harassment.92  
Another quirky aspect of Brooks is the extraordinarily high bar 
it sets for demonstrating “severe” harassment.93 Recall that the alleged 
harasser, Selvaggio, was convicted of criminal sexual assault for his 
conduct and spent 120 days in jail.94 Brooks holds, in effect, that a 
reasonable person would not consider criminal sexual assault at work 
severe enough conduct to sustain a claim for sexual harassment.95 This 
seems a strange proposition. 
Even stranger is Judge Kozinski’s discussion in Brooks of 
Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace,96 which involved a violent rape in which 
a coworker detained the plaintiff overnight, “slapped her, tore off her 
shirt, beat her, hit her on the head with a radio, choked her with a 
phone cord and ultimately forced her to have sex with him.”97 Judge 
Kozinski’s discussion of this case suggests that sexually unwelcome 
conduct in the workplace that falls short of violent rape is not “severe” 
enough to “create a work environment that a reasonable person would 
consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive.”98  
In fact, Brooks goes even further, suggesting that even rape on 
the job might not support a hostile environment claim: “If the incident 
here were as severe as that in Al-Dabbagh, we would have to grapple 
with the difficult question of whether a single incident can so 
permeate the workplace as to support a hostile work environment 
claim.”99 Few judges have been so bold as to claim that even violent 
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rape could not support a sexual harassment case, but a considerable 
number of judges belittle what happened to plaintiffs in sexual 
harassment cases by pointing out that it was not sexual assault or 
rape.100  
The Brooks court’s suggestion that even the most severe sexual 
violence must “permeate” the workplace in order to constitute 
harassment is a flagrant misreading of Supreme Court precedent, 
which makes sexual harassment actionable if it is “sufficiently severe 
or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an 
abusive working environment.’”101 The “permeate” language comes 
from Harris v. Forklift, the landmark case that involved allegations 
that harassment was pervasive not severe.102 It makes sense to require 
pervasive sexual harassment “permeate” a workplace, but it is unclear 
what it might mean for a single instance of severe sexual harassment 
to do so. The Supreme Court has held that sometimes harassment is so 
serious that it need not be pervasive and therefore need not “permeate” 
the environment.103  
Recall that even after Brooks pushed Selvaggio away, he came 
at her again and fondled her breast and then attempted to approach her 
a third time.104 “Fortunately, another dispatcher arrived,” notes Judge 
Kozinski.105 What if the other dispatcher had not arrived? A reasonable 
jury might find that Brooks, after having been groped and 
propositioned, found the situation hostile, indeed frightening, as 
Selvaggio repeatedly came at her when she was in a vulnerable 
situation. Brooks could not simply hang up on 911 calls and run. 
Courts sometimes do not recognize the anxiety that may pervade the 
workplace for victims who do not know how far a harasser will go 
when he or she follows them into the bathroom, grabs their breasts or 
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buttocks, or exposes him or herself and tells the victim that he or she 
has no self control.106 A reasonable jury today might well find that 
Selvaggio’s behavior made the 911 dispatch office a hostile 
environment for Brooks.  
Brooks offered a muddied legal analysis in its consideration of 
whether Brooks’s employer could be held liable for Selvaggio’s 
conduct. Given that Selvaggio was not Brooks’s supervisor, a 
negligence standard applied: The city would be liable for Selvaggio’s 
conduct only if it knew or should have known of Selvaggio’s 
conduct.107 Judge Kozinski mentioned this in a footnote, but he never 
mentioned or applied this standard in the text.108 If the negligence 
standard had been applied, the facts of Brooks suggest that a 
reasonable jury might have concluded that the city should have known 
of Selvaggio’s behavior for a simple reason: It had happened at least 
twice before.109 Judge Kozinski asserted that Selvaggio’s conduct 
toward Brooks was an isolated incident,110 but his own recitation of the 
facts shows that that was flatly untrue: Judge Kozinski admitted that 
Selvaggio had made similar advances to at least two other female 
coworkers.111 The court also noted that Brooks “cannot rely on 
Selvaggio’s misconduct with other female employees because she did 
not know about it at the time of Selvaggio’s attack.”112 The fact that 
Brooks did not know about the prior assaults does not establish that the 
employer should not have known about them. A reasonable jury could 
have found that Selvaggio’s behavior altered the conditions of 
Brooks’s employment by making it necessary to fend off sexual 
advances while fielding emergency calls and then to keep quiet about 
it. Making reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, a jury could 
have found that the employer had created a climate of permission in 
which Selvaggio felt free to assault his colleagues and where women 
were silenced because they believed that they would suffer retaliation 
if they complained—a prediction that proved true in Brooks’s case, as 
discussed below.113 While Judge Kozinski’s opinion only considers 
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this evidence in the context of the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the same 
evidence is relevant to the issue of whether the employer should have 
known about Selvaggio’s on-the-job assaults. 
Turning to Brooks’s retaliation claim, Brooks needed to prove 
that her employer took an adverse employment action against her in 
response to her sexual harassment complaint.114 When Brooks returned 
to her post after reporting the incident, she was denied her prior shift 
and given a less desirable one; she was denied her desired vacation 
schedule; her male coworkers ostracized her; the city was slow to 
process her workers’ compensation claim; and ultimately, she 
received a “needs improvement” performance evaluation, a 
downgrade from her prior “satisfactory” rating.115 The city introduced 
no evidence to contradict any of this—or at least no evidence the Ninth 
Circuit considered compelling enough to mention.116 These facts lend 
understanding to why at least two other women who were assaulted 
by Selvaggio before Brooks said nothing.117 Despite Brooks’s 
extensive evidence of retaliation, instead of sending the claim to a jury 
to decide whether the city retaliated against Brooks, Judge Kozinski 
decided the issue himself.118 In doing so, he discounted the negative 
performance evaluation, which is considered an adverse employment 
action under clear Ninth Circuit precedent.119 He likewise discounted 
the vacation denial and the unfavorable shift on the grounds that they 
were “subject to modification” because Brooks “abandoned her job” 
while appeals were pending.120 This put Brooks in a position where, to 
preserve her legal rights, she would have had to continue to work in 
an environment so upsetting that it had already driven her to take a 
disability leave.121 This approach is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s assurance in Harris v. Forklift that “Title VII comes into play 
before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”122  
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Judge Kozinski achieved this result by disaggregating the 
evidence of retaliation and discounting each piece of evidence one by 
one.123 He discounted the ostracism on the grounds that “an employer 
cannot force employees to socialize with one another.”124 As noted, he 
discounted the unfavorable shift, the denial of Brooks’s desired 
vacation time, and the negative evaluation on the grounds that the 
decisions were not final.125 This approach is what another 
commentator has called the “divide-and-conquer strategy.”126 It is a 
common defense strategy often used in criminal cases in which one 
“isolate[s] each piece [of evidence] . . . and then attempts to trivialize 
it by taking it out of context.”127 The divide-and-conquer strategy is 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent that has repeatedly 
instructed lower courts to consider whether a hostile environment 
existed using a totality-of-the-circumstances test that considers the 
evidence as a whole in its social context.128 Considering each piece of 
evidence in isolation is the opposite of considering the totality of the 
circumstances, which focuses on the cumulative effect. 
As is commonplace in the cases-in-chief discussed in this 
Article, the divide-and-conquer strategy is used to support the decision 
to prevent the case from going to a jury.129 As is again commonplace, 
Brooks does so by ignoring the totality-of-the-circumstances test as 
articulated by the Supreme Court and instead tuning out virtually 
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everything except the “severe or pervasive” language, holding that 
what happened to Brooks was not severe as a matter of law.130 
What is the significance of the fact that this extraordinarily 
influential opinion was written by Judge Kozinski? In 2008, Judge 
Kozinski was admonished for posting on a publicly accessible website 
sexually explicit and degrading images of women, including one 
where naked women were painted to look like cows.131 He was 
admonished for embarrassing the judiciary.132  
Kozinski was unrepentant, just as he was more recently when 
allegations emerged that he had sexually harassed interns and clerks 
since the 1980s.133 Ultimately, at least fifteen women publicly accused 
Judge Kozinski of groping their breasts and legs, showing them 
pornography in chambers asking if they found it sexually arousing, 
giving them prolonged kisses on the cheek, and soliciting sex.134 “If 
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this is all they are able to dredge up after thirty-five years, I am not too 
worried,” commented the judge after the initial allegations first 
became public.135 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed.136 He appointed the 
Judicial Council of the Second Circuit to lead an investigation, 
whereupon Judge Kozinski resigned.137  
Thus, the judge who wrote one of the most cited sexual 
harassment opinions in the country was deeply out of sync with what 
his colleagues felt was reasonable behavior at work. Brooks v. San 
Mateo is equally out of sync with what a reasonable jury would find 
today, when groping is nigh-universally seen as sexual harassment, 
and 86% of Americans believe in zero tolerance for sexual 
harassment.138  
2. Subsequent Cases Have Used Brooks as the Standard for 
Sexual Harassment in the Ninth Circuit and Elsewhere 
Notwithstanding the poor analyses and inaccurate application of 
Supreme Court precedent, Brooks continues to be cited by courts. The 
current use of Brooks keeps sexual harassment cases away from juries 
and dismisses plaintiffs’ claims of sexual harassment in cases 
involving groping and sexual assaults. One such case involved the 
plaintiff’s alleged post-traumatic stress disorder as the result of sexual 
assault.139  
In the 2008 case of Dolan v. United States, the plaintiff was a 
student firefighter at the Department of Land Services.140 She was 
harassed and assaulted by her mentor.141 While she was on a business 
trip, her mentor asked the plaintiff if she had a place to stay and offered 
to let her stay at his place; the plaintiff trusted him, viewed him as a 
mentor, and did not think he was sexually interested in her.142 When 
she arrived, he had been drinking, but the plaintiff had seen him drink 
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in past without incident and was not concerned.143 However, she 
became uncomfortable when he started to slur his speech and was 
relieved when he went to bed.144 Ten to fifteen minutes later, he 
returned wearing only boxer shorts, straddled her while she was sitting 
in a chair, rubbed his genitals against her, and tried to kiss her.145 He 
held her in the chair for about ten minutes before she pushed him off.146 
She thought he was trying to rape her, ran to the bathroom and locked 
herself inside; he banged on the door and shouted at her to open it.147 
Eventually, she fled the scene.148 The court cited Brooks and said this 
case was similar: “Although the conduct by [the mentor] [was] 
certainly egregious and totally unacceptable, it was an isolated 
incident and it was never repeated.”149 The court cited Brooks to 
support its conclusion that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to 
show that a reasonable person would find the environment hostile and 
granted summary judgment for the employer.150  
In the 2011 case of Sanders v. Mohtheshum, the plaintiff worked 
at a Pizza Hut.151 She was harassed by her manager, who groped her 
buttocks with two hands in front of other employees.152 He was 
charged with a misdemeanor after the plaintiff reported the incident to 
local police who came and removed the manager from the store.153 The 
court cited Brooks for the proposition that a reasonable woman in the 
plaintiff’s position would not have believed the terms and conditions 
of employment had been altered by the incident and granted summary 
judgment for the employer.154 
In the 2014 case of Ludovico v. Kaiser Permanente, the plaintiff 
was a nurse whose coworker grabbed her by her shoulder, pulled her 
in so that she was not free to leave, and said he would “take his big 
wet tongue and shove it into [her] mouth a few times and he was sure 
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[she] would like that.”155 The court cited Brooks to hold that the 
harassment was not pervasive because it was only a single incident 
and was not severe enough to alter conditions of employment.156 The 
court concluded that the plaintiff had not proved a reasonable person 
would find the environment hostile.157 The court granted the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment and cited Brooks to defeat 
the plaintiff’s retaliation claim.158 
Nelson v. Zinke is a 2018 case in which the plaintiff was a 
toxicologist at the Department of the Interior.159 During a scuba diving 
mission, the plaintiff and a fellow scientist slept in a small one-room 
cabin with two bunk beds.160 On the night of the incident, they had 
dinner and drank wine before the plaintiff took a sleeping pill and went 
to bed.161 The plaintiff recalled that her coworker told her he snored, 
and she teased him by saying she had earplugs and had taken a 
sleeping pill.162 During the night, the plaintiff became aware that 
someone was in her bed but was still not awake enough to be aware of 
what was happening.163 The plaintiff could feel that the person had 
lifted her top, was fondling her breasts, and pulled her long underwear 
bottoms down.164 She was still groggy, wondered where she was, and 
thought that her husband was with her.165 When she became more 
aware and knew something was not right, she stood up from her bunk, 
and her coworker quickly moved back to his own.166 The next day 
during a hike, her coworker told her he only realized she was asleep 
once she got up from the bunk.167 He made comments including 
describing sliding his hand up her leg to “hit her where it counts” and 
his attempt to remove her long underwear to “go down on her,” 
claiming he thought she was receptive.168 The plaintiff alleged she 
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suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, and after this incident, 
work became a daily trigger.169  
The court cited Brooks for the proposition that “no reasonable 
woman in [the plaintiff’s] position would believe” that this isolated 
incident permanently altered the terms or conditions of her 
employment.170 The court granted summary judgment for the 
employer for both this claim and the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, again 
citing Brooks.171  
3. Ninth Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What 
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today  
The prior Subsection described just a few of the over 1,200 cases 
citing Brooks. Many repeat its conclusion that women who were 
groped and assaulted were not sexually harassed. Instead of further 
entrenching the infinite regression of anachronism, courts in the Ninth 
Circuit should turn to two other oft-cited cases, Ellison v. Brady172 and 
Fuller v. Oakland, to support allowing juries to decide what’s 
reasonable now.173  
a. Ellison v. Brady 
Ellison also took place in San Mateo.174 The case involved an 
Internal Revenue Service agent, Sterling Gray, who became obsessed 
with the plaintiff.175 First he asked her to lunch, and she accepted.176 
Then he asked her for a drink after work, and she declined, suggesting 
lunch instead, although then she tried to stay away from the office 
during lunchtime to avoid his invitation.177 When he finally caught up 
to her, she declined him outright when he showed up in a three-piece 
suit and asked her out again.178 Gray then wrote the plaintiff a bizarre 
note telling her he cried over her the night before and professing his 
love.179 The plaintiff became “shocked and frightened” and left their 
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common workspace, but Gray followed her and demanded they talk.180 
The plaintiff left the building and showed the note to her supervisor 
who remarked, “this is sexual harassment.”181 The plaintiff asked her 
supervisor to let her handle it, which she did by asking a male 
coworker to talk to Gray and tell him that the plaintiff was not 
interested and that he should leave her alone.182 The plaintiff then 
relocated for four weeks of training in a different city, only to receive 
a three-page, single-spaced letter from Gray professing his love in 
unhinged terms.183  
Importantly, the court considered the experience from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation in real 
time:  
We cannot say as a matter of law that Ellison’s reaction was idiosyncratic 
or hyper-sensitive. . . . [Gray] told her that he had been “watching” her and 
“experiencing” her; he made repeated references to sex; he said he would 
write again. Ellison had no way of knowing what Gray would do next. A 
reasonable woman could consider Gray’s conduct, as alleged by Ellison, 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a condition of employment and 
create an abusive working environment.”184  
The court noted: “Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual 
harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser’s conduct 
is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.”185 The court went on to 
hold that “Title VII’s protection of employees from sex discrimination 
comes into play long before the point where victims” experience 
psychological harm,186 a holding subsequently adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift.187 
b. Fuller v. Oakland 
Fuller v. Oakland, which has been cited 683 times, is another 
case that is in sync with contemporary understandings of sexual 
harassment.188 The plaintiff, Patricia Fuller, was a former police officer 
who had a romantic relationship with a fellow officer, Antonio 
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Romero.189 After Fuller broke up with Romero, he repeatedly phoned 
Fuller and hung up.190 Romero retrieved her changed and unlisted 
phone number from personnel records and continued this behavior.191 
After Romero called her at work and threatened to kill himself, Fuller 
again changed her home number.192 Romero confronted Fuller in the 
police parking lot, blocked her exit, and made it clear that he would 
not let her leave until she gave him her unlisted number once again.193 
Fuller again changed her phone number.194 Yet again, Romero 
retrieved it from her personnel files.195  
Close to a year after her breakup with Romero, Fuller was 
driving with her new boyfriend when Romero came speeding at them 
in an unmarked police car.196 Romero forced Fuller to swerve to avoid 
head-on collision.197 Romero continued his harassment, conducting an 
investigation of arrest rates that Fuller said focused solely on herself 
and her allies.198 Romero also allegedly delayed action on Fuller’s 
requests at work, gave her poor quality work assignments, and asked 
her for an alibi when his car was stolen.199 Fuller reported “feeling 
ostracized and afraid for her safety, because visible isolation on the 
beat endangers an officer’s safety.”200 She developed a severe stress 
disorder, went on disability leave, and ultimately resigned.201  
The Ninth Circuit overturned the trial court’s holding that the 
alleged conduct was insufficiently severe and pervasive and held that 
a hostile environment existed.202 The court enumerated the long list of 
Romero’s actions, focusing on the time he called her and threatened 
to kill himself and when he ran her and her new boyfriend off the 
road.203 These two “incidents, while only single incidents, [were] 
sufficiently extreme such that Fuller would no longer know what to 
expect next from Romero, and reasonably [would] be concerned that 
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he might do anything at any time.”204 The court then focused on 
Romero’s persistence in obtaining her unlisted phone number, which 
“would reasonably lead Fuller to believe that, no matter how much she 
tried, she couldn’t escape Romero. Taken together, the fear that 
Romero might do anything and the fact that she couldn’t escape would 
lead a reasonable woman to feel her working environment had been 
altered.”205 Like Ellison, Fuller considered what a reasonable person 
in the plaintiff’s position would consider frightening and 
inappropriate.206  
Ellison v. Brady and Fuller v. Oakland are more consistent than 
Brooks v. San Mateo,207 both with Supreme Court precedent 
mandating courts consider the totality of the circumstances and with 
what reasonable people and juries would likely believe constitutes 
sexual harassment today.208  
B. The Eleventh Circuit: Mendoza v. Borden and Its Progeny 
1. Mendoza v. Borden 
In the 1999 case of Mendoza v. Borden, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld a trial court’s directed verdict, again taking the case away from 
a jury.209 Mendoza, though cited in 1,180 other cases, was 
controversial when decided—there was an en banc rehearing, and the 
eleven judges who decided it wrote five different opinions.210  
Mendoza was an accounting clerk who alleged sexual 
harassment by Daniel Page, the plant controller and highest-ranking 
executive at her work site.211 Mendoza testified that Page followed her 
around not only when she was working but also during lunch when 
she went outside to eat at a picnic table.212 Mendoza testified that 
“[Page] would look me up and down, very, in an obvious fashion.”213 
Three times he “looked at [her] up and down, and stopped in [her] 
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groin area and made a . . . sniffing motion.”214 One day while Mendoza 
was at a fax machine, Page came up and “rubbed his right hip up 
against [Mendoza’s] left hip” while grabbing her shoulders; “he had a 
smile on his face . . . like he was enjoying himself.”215 This is not a 
form of physical contact that happens inadvertently. When Mendoza 
went into Page’s office, angry, and said, “I came in here to work, 
period,” he replied, “[Y]eah, I’m getting all fired up, too.”216 
Mendoza reflects three outdated norms: (1) sexual harassment is 
not actionable unless it consists of “uninhibited sexual threats”217 or 
the like; (2) it is difficult to figure out what constitutes harassment 
because men and women perceive sexual behaviors very differently;218 
and (3) “mere” comments, looks, and physical contact are not severe 
enough to be considered sexual harassment.219 
The Mendoza majority correctly stated that the Oncale test 
requires that “the objective severity of the harassment should be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’”220 However, instead of 
examining what a reasonable person in Mendoza’s position would 
think, the court veered into a long string of earlier cases in which 
courts found no sexual harassment in the context of egregious 
behavior such as groping of breasts and buttocks, simulated 
masturbation, and comments such as calling one plaintiff a “sick 
bitch,” telling another “you have the sleekest ass” and inquiring about 
the color of a coworker’s nipples.221 This infinite regression of 
                                                   
 214. Id. at 1243. 
 215. Id. at 1243, 1272. 
 216. Id. at 1243. 
 217. Id. at 1247 (quoting Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 
263 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 218. See id. at 1256. 
 219. Id. at 1257. 
 220. Id. at 1246 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 118 S. 
Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 
(1993))). 
 221. See Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(describing “four isolated incidents in which a co-worker briefly touched her arm, 
fingers, and buttocks” and coworkers who made the plaintiff the butt of sexual jokes 
and repeatedly stared at her breasts); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 
768 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing a situation where a plaintiff’s supervisor touched 
plaintiff’s breasts (but only once, we’re reassured) and was told she had the “sleekest 
ass”); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(describing how a male plaintiff’s supervisor stared at his crotch with a magnifying 
class, stared at him in the bathroom, and touched his clothing); Shepherd v. 
Comptroller of Public Accounts of State of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999) 
170 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
anachronism ended with the court citing a 1999 Fifth Circuit case that 
mischaracterized Supreme Court precedent: “All of the sexual hostile 
environment cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved 
patterns or allegations of extensive, long-lasting, unredressed, and 
uninhibited sexual threats or conduct that permeated the plaintiffs’ 
work environment.”222 This is very different from the Harris 
reasonableness standard. The court seemed to be saying that no 
reasonable person or jury could find a hostile atmosphere in a wide 
variety of contexts, which most Americans consider sexual 
harassment today.223 At a deeper level, the view that only an extensive 
pattern of uninhibited threats can sustain a cause of action for sexual 
harassment clearly signals the belief that sexual harassment is not 
serious unless it is downright frightening.  
The five different opinions in Mendoza give dramatically 
different interpretations of the evidence.224 Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting 
opinion described Page’s behavior as “stalking and leering” that 
continued for at least four months until Mendoza quit her job.225 “Page 
stared at Mendoza’s groin on at least three occasions and made a loud, 
sniffing sound. For unexplained reasons, Mendoza failed to become 
enraptured. In fact, she became rather terrified.”226 Mendoza 
complained to one coworker that Page harassed her at least twelve 
different times.227 “She had been stalked, leered at, touched on her hips 
and shoulders, and her groin area had been made the object of a 
sniffing ritual so bizarre that only Page could understand its true 
import.”228 Judge Tjoflat concluded that “Mendoza’s whole 
employment experience at Borden’s may have been pervaded by overt 
and highly offensive acts of sexual aggression.”229 
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The majority took a very different view of the evidence.230 The 
statement about being fired up did not, as a matter of law, “objectively 
indicate . . . a sexual or other gender-related connotation.”231 The 
“‘following and staring’ may betray a romantic or sexual attraction,” 
the majority noted, but it was also “a natural and unavoidable 
occurrence when people work together in close quarters or when a 
supervisor keeps an eye on employees.”232 Which was it in this 
context? Didn’t that determination involve a finding of fact? This 
court did not think so.233 The incident at the fax machine was dismissed 
as “one slight touching,” ignoring the fact that to grasp both someone’s 
shoulders while at the same time touching his or her hip with one’s 
own hip could reasonably be interpreted as miming of sex rather than 
a run-of-the-mill office ricochet.234  
And that is the point. Assuming (as we do) that these five judges 
were reasonable people, this was a case in which reasonable people 
not only could but actually did disagree.235 That makes it an 
inappropriate case for a directed verdict. In a directed verdict situation, 
the court must assume that all of the evidence of the nonmoving party 
is true and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.236 The 
case “may be taken from the jury only if no rational jury could find 
against the [plaintiff].”237 To quote Judge Barkett, “assuming there are 
reasonable people who, while crediting Mendoza’s version of the fact, 
would not think that staring at a woman’s groin area while making 
sexually suggestive sniffing noises is degrading, humiliating, and/or 
intimidating, it seems beyond peradventure that many reasonable 
people would indeed find it to be so.”238  
Why, then, did the majority take the case away from the jury? 
“In its zeal to discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits,” wrote Judge 
Tjoflat, “the court today hands down an opinion that will certainly be 
used by other courts as a model of how not to reason in hostile 
environment sexual harassment cases.”239 Judge Tjoflat was 
presumably disappointed by Mendoza’s continued influence. 
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One judge who sided with the majority attributed his decision to 
“the reluctance courts should have about permitting plaintiffs who 
claim sexual harassment to rely on their subjective impressions of 
ambiguous conduct.”240 This comment shows a lack of command of 
sexual harassment law. As the court itself noted in the majority 
opinion, the hostile environment test requires plaintiffs to prove that 
the environment would be seen as hostile by a reasonable person—an 
objective test.241 This is the classic legal mechanism for protecting 
against a hypersensitive plaintiff.  
Judge Tjoflat’s opinion also pointed out how the majority 
misapplied Supreme Court precedent that requires courts to judge the 
objective severity of an alleged harasser’s conduct from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, 
considering “all the circumstances” (to quote Oncale v. Sundowner)242 
or by “looking at all the circumstances” (to quote Harris v. Forklift).243 
Instead, the Mendoza majority did what “every defense attorney” does 
when faced with circumstantial evidence: “[I]solate each piece that the 
other side puts into evidence and then attempt to trivialize it by taking 
it out of context.”244 Judge Tjoflat continued, “[B]y examining each of 
Mendoza’s allegations of harassment in isolation from one another, 
the majority concludes that Mendoza does not have enough evidence 
to reach the jury because each allegation is individually 
insufficient.”245 
A final limitation of the Mendoza majority opinion is its 
excessive focus on whether the conduct involved was physically 
threatening or humiliating. The majority contrasted the facts in 
Mendoza with those in a case where female employees were held 
down so that other employees could touch their breasts and legs.246 
While that behavior is certainly physically threatening and 
intimidating, the lack of similar behavior in Mendoza is irrelevant: 
Harris v. Forklift did not require that conduct be physically 
intimidating in order to constitute sexual harassment.247 As will be 
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discussed in more detail below, these words appeared only as part of 
a non-inclusive list of factors that “may” exist, in the context of an 
exhortation by the Supreme Court that lower courts should look at the 
totality of the circumstances.248  
2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Mendoza to Ratchet Up the 
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Eleventh Circuit 
Despite deep disagreement on the panel that decided it, 
numerous sub-cases cite Mendoza to ratchet up the standard for what 
constitutes sexual harassment. In the 2010 case of Wallace v. Baker 
Beauty, Inc., two plaintiffs were harassed by the head of their 
company.249 The head of the company looked at his female sales 
representatives and said: “I’ll tell you how I make my money off y’all: 
I pimp out all my hoes”; commented that a stylist had a “nice ass”; 
bragged about having sex with a particular woman and the types of 
things he would do with her; called one plaintiff a “stupid bitch” 
during a sales meeting; recited the phrase “jack each other off”; made 
comments about a customer “looking sexy with those ta-tas hanging 
out”; and laid on a hotel bed in front of one plaintiff and a customer, 
unzipped his pants, and said to the plaintiff, “you know if you ever get 
any fake boobs, you’re going to have to let me see and feel them.”250 
The court used Mendoza to support its conclusion that the conduct was 
not sufficiently severe or pervasive, neglecting to mention the 
controlling reasonableness standard.251 The court granted summary 
judgment for the employer.252  
The 2010 case of Lindquist v. Fulton County involved a 
detention officer harassed by her supervisor.253 The supervisor said 
“Hon, I’ve got to do this,” and kissed her buttocks; grabbed her finger 
as she wrote in a log book and said “Damn, you are so beautiful, why 
don’t you come over here and sit on my lap?”; told her he wished he 
was the chair she was sitting on so that she would be sitting on him; 
commented he “wanted to make passionate love to her”; and asked 
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“what she would do if he just leaned over and kissed her.”254 The court 
cited Mendoza to support its conclusion that the facts “d[id] not satisfy 
the severe or pervasive harassment requirement,” characterizing the 
facts as “inappropriate comments and one isolated incident.”255 The 
court once again ignored controlling precedent on reasonableness and 
granted summary judgment for the employer.256 
In the 2016 case of Baldelamar v. Jefferson Southern 
Corporation, the plaintiff’s coworker harassed her by telling her that 
Mexicans shouldn’t shave their genitals, touching her buttocks, 
hugging her from behind and pulling her close to his belly, using a 
measuring tape to simulate his penis and telling her he had a big one, 
standing behind her while she was working and making gestures as if 
he was having sex with her, sticking his tongue out at her while 
looking at her genitals, inviting her to a hotel to have sex, soliciting 
her to accompany him into a tunnel at the workplace so he could have 
sex with her, and more.257 The court cited Mendoza to once again 
consider the “severe or pervasive” issue without considering whether 
a reasonable jury could find an objectively hostile work 
environment.258 The court noted only that the harassment “f[ell] far 
short of the threshold level of ‘severe or pervasive’ conduct 
established by Eleventh Circuit precedent” and adopted the 
recommendation of the magistrate judge that summary judgment be 
granted for the employer.259  
These cases, and others among the over 1,100 cases that have 
cited Mendoza, have ratcheted up the standard for what constitutes a 
hostile environment in the Eleventh Circuit in ways that are 
inconsistent with what reasonable people and juries would find today. 
3. Eleventh Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What 
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today  
Another oft-cited Eleventh Circuit case deserves more attention, 
not only because it is more consonant with what reasonable people 
would consider sexual harassment today, but also because it provides 
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an important corrective to a common misinterpretation of Harris v. 
Forklift.260  
Allen v. Tyson Foods has been cited 2,651 times, yet the vast 
majority of those citations use Allen to discuss civil procedure 
standards for summary judgment.261 Only 165 cases cite Allen on the 
issue of hostile work environment sexual harassment, and this aspect 
of the case deserves to be cited more. Allen involved a poultry 
processing plant in Alabama that was “engulfed by an atmosphere of 
improper sexuality” involving sexual intercourse at the plant, sexually 
graphic jokes, vulgar and sexually demeaning language, groping, 
exhibiting of genitalia and buttocks, and using chicken parts to mimic 
sexual organs and activities.262 The plaintiff’s supervisor wrote her at 
least five sexually explicit notes, and the plaintiff claimed she was 
“intimidated and harassed” by her supervisor and other employees.263 
The Eleventh Circuit properly referred to the Supreme Court’s 
“totality of the circumstances” test; but even more important is the 
court’s language about whether sexual harassment needs to be 
“physically threatening or humiliating” in order to constitute a hostile 
work environment.264  
That language comes from the Supreme Court’s Harris v. 
Forklift, which says that the factors for assessing whether an 
environment is hostile “may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 
it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”265 
The Allen court correctly noted that the “Supreme Court has provided 
a non-exclusive set of factors to consider.”266 Too often, as in 
Mendoza, courts act inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court 
precedent and with what most reasonable people believe today by 
treating the plaintiff’s failure to prove that the harassing behavior was 
physically threatening as per se proof that what occurred was not 
serious enough to constitute sexual harassment.267 
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Accordingly, courts in the Eleventh Circuit should look to Allen 
as an important corrective to cases that use the factors listed in Harris 
v. Forklift to ratchet up the standard, in effect holding that sexual 
harassment exists only when the behavior involved is truly threatening 
or intimidating.268 This misinterpretation of the plain language of 
Harris v. Forklift clearly reflects the now-outdated view that sexual 
harassment is not serious unless it contains an element of threats or 
violence. Recall that violence is no longer required even for proof of 
rape.269 
C. The Seventh Circuit: Baskerville v. Culligan and Its Progeny 
1. Baskerville v. Culligan 
A third commonly cited case is Baskerville v. Culligan 
International Company, which has been cited 852 times since it was 
decided in 1995.270 This Seventh Circuit opinion was written by Judge 
Richard Posner, who announced himself “reluctant to upset a jury 
verdict challenged only for resting on insufficient evidence” yet 
managed to soldier on and do so.271 Judge Posner found for the 
employer as a matter of law on the following facts.272  
Valerie Baskerville was a secretary in the marketing department 
of a Chicago manufacturer of products for treating water.273 Her 
manager was Michael Hall who, Judge Posner said, “we assume 
truthfully” engaged in an unending series of puerile attempts at sexual 
humor.274 When Baskerville asked if he had gotten a Valentine’s Day 
card for his wife (who had not yet moved to Chicago), he responded 
by miming masturbation.275 Once when Baskerville wore a leather 
skirt, Hall grunted “um um um” in a way she interpreted as sexual.276 
When the public address system began, “May I have your attention 
please,” Hall went to Baskerville’s desk and said, “You know what 
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that means, don’t you? All pretty girls run around naked.”277 When 
Baskerville commented that Hall’s office was hot, Hall raised his 
eyebrows and said, “Not until you stepped your foot in here.”278 When 
she brought him a document to sign, instead of treating her as a 
colleague with a job to do, he said: “There’s always a pretty girl giving 
me something to sign off on.”279 He told her his wife had told him that 
he had better clean up his act and “better think of you as Ms. Anita 
Hill,” an evident admission that Hall’s wife believed he was sexually 
harassing Baskerville (and he didn’t seem to disagree).280 Hall told 
Baskerville that he had left the Christmas party early because he 
“didn’t want to lose control” with so many pretty girls there.281  
The jury thought that a reasonable person would find this 
environment hostile and found for Baskerville.282 Judge Posner 
overturned the jury verdict in an opinion that reflected three outdated 
norms: (1) that sexual harassment is not serious or that it can be taken 
seriously only when the behaviors complained of make the workplace 
“hellish”; (2) that women who accuse men of sexual harassment are 
not credible; and (3) that (instead of having a zero-tolerance policy) 
employers are free to tolerate sexual harassment so long as it comes in 
the form of lame jokes.283  
Judge Posner wrote off Hall’s sexual comments as merely 
“boorish” and asserted that the “concept of sexual harassment is 
designed to protect working women from the kind of male attentions 
that can make the workplace hellish.”284 Judge Posner continued, “He 
never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explicitly or by 
implication, to have sex with him . . . He made no threats. He did not 
expose himself, or show her dirty pictures.”285 This entirely misses the 
#MeToo point: When women show up for work, they are entitled to 
be treated as colleagues, not sexual opportunities.  
Judge Posner diminished the harassment experienced by 
Baskerville by comparing it to sexual assault: “On the one side lie 
sexual assaults . . . on the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, 
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tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.”286 “It is 
difficult to imagine a context that would render Hall’s sallies 
threatening or otherwise deeply disturbing.”287 Once again, a court 
misread Harris v. Forklift to support the view that inappropriate 
workplace behavior is not sexual harassment unless it is truly 
threatening, and once again, a court ignored the Harris reasonableness 
standard.288  
Judge Posner’s characterization of Hall’s behavior as “boorish,” 
often repeated by the courts, comes close to the “boys will be boys” 
attitude that long has been used to excuse male misbehavior.289 The 
Baskerville jury rejected this even in the early 1990s, and it is even 
more unlikely that a contemporary jury would accept it today.290 
Also intriguing is Judge Posner’s aside, “we assume truthfully” 
when reciting the plaintiff’s allegations.291 The opinion contains no 
reference to an allegation by the employer that the plaintiff was 
lying.292 It is true that the relevant procedural standard is that a judge 
overturning a jury verdict must take all inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, but that is different from having a judge, sua sponte 
and without evidence, raise questions about a plaintiff’s 
truthfulness.293 Did Posner’s aside reflect the stereotype, still common 
in 1995, that women who complained of sexual harassment cannot be 
trusted?294 If so, this is another way in which Baskerville is inconsistent 
with what a reasonable jury would likely believe today.295  
Judge Posner made much of the fact that Hall was “a man whose 
sense of humor took final shape in adolescence.”296 But a lame sense 
of humor is not a defense in a sexual harassment case. Even if Judge 
Posner’s views reflected what a reasonable person and jury might 
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think in 1995—though they appear not to—they clearly do not reflect 
what a jury would likely believe now that 96% of women and 86% of 
men believe that touching or groping constitutes sexual harassment, 
and 86% of women and 70% of men now feel that making sexual 
comments about someone’s body is sexual harassment.297  
2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Baskerville to Ratchet Up the 
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Seventh Circuit 
Baskerville has been widely cited to heighten the standard for 
what constitutes an actionable hostile work environment in the 
Seventh Circuit. In the 2007 case of Britz v. White, a female plaintiff 
was harassed by a female supervisor who, when she was standing at 
her desk leaning over to write something, slapped her on the 
buttocks.298 When the plaintiff said, “Hey, that was my butt,” the 
supervisor responded, “[O]h, I know. It was just sticking out there, 
though.”299 Once, when the plaintiff was standing in her cubicle 
wearing a skirt, the supervisor grabbed the bottom of her skirt and 
tugged it.300 The supervisor also came up behind the plaintiff and 
tugged her hair, poked her in the side, and told her “I love you so 
much.”301 The court cited Baskerville to support the contention that 
“the concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working 
women from the kind of . . . attentions that can make the workplace 
hellish.”302  Relying on Baskerville’s proposition that on one side is 
sexual assaults, nonconsensual physical contact, and uninvited 
solicitations, while on the other side is vulgar banter, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that a 
reasonable jury could find that the conduct was objectively severe or 
pervasive and granted summary judgment for the employer.303 
In the 2008 case of Enriquez v. United States Cellular 
Corporation, four plaintiffs were harassed by their manager.304 The 
manager asked the first to lie across his desk in lingerie; told her 
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“those . . . pants look good on your ass”; “you have a nice body”; 
“[your] tits are going to look nice in that shirt”; and attempted to kiss 
her.305 He told the second plaintiff “you’ve got a nice ass”; asked to see 
her breasts several times; and asked “when are you going to let me lick 
your tits?”306 The third plaintiff he approached at a Christmas party, 
“pushed her legs open, and picked her up to dance, holding her with 
her legs around his waist for [about] thirty seconds.”307 The manager 
also sent her text messages, including one that said that she “had a bad 
boy for a boss and she didn’t know the things he could do with her,” 
told her he wanted to go out for drinks and “get her drunk so he could 
take advantage of her and have her do things that would probably 
cause trouble for him,” and told her “you look good enough to eat right 
now.”308 He called the fourth plaintiff and asked when they were going 
to “hook up,” twice lifted her up by grasping the outside of her thighs 
and called her “juicy,” and twice tried to kiss her.309 The court cited 
Baskerville to hold that “a few advances,” comments, and 
“one . . . brief contact” did not create an objectively hostile work 
environment, and the court granted summary judgment for the 
employer.310 
These cases show the way courts have cited Baskerville to 
preclude a finding of sexual harassment in the context of facts that are 
even more egregious than those involved Baskerville. If Baskerville 
itself is inconsistent with what a reasonable person or jury would find 
today, its progeny are even more so.  
3. Seventh Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What 
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today  
Two often-cited Seventh Circuit cases are more consistent than 
Baskerville with Supreme Court precedent and with what reasonable 
people believe today.  
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a. Hostetler v. Quality Dining  
Hostetler v. Quality Dining, which has been cited 312 times, 
involved the assistant manager of a restaurant whose fellow assistant 
manager “grabbed her face one day at work and stuck his tongue down 
her throat.”311 The next day when he tried again, she put her head 
between her knees, at which point he started unfastening her bra.312 
During the same week, he approached her while she was serving 
customers at the counter and told her, “in crude terms, that he could 
perform oral sex on her so effectively that ‘[she] would do 
cartwheels.’”313 When she reported him, she was transferred to another 
restaurant that required a long commute and a redeye shift that got her 
home most nights at 4:00 a.m.314 She received counseling for the 
trauma and was taking Prozac at the time of her deposition.315 The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that 
what happened was not severe.316 
The Fifth Circuit noted that, while Title VII is not a “general 
civility code,”317  
We have no doubt that the type of conduct at issue here falls on the 
actionable side of the line dividing abusive conduct from behavior that is 
merely vulgar or mildly offensive. . . . Having a coworker insert his tongue 
into one’s mouth without invitation and having one’s brassiere nearly 
removed is not conduct that would be anticipated in the workplace, and 
certainly not in a family restaurant. A reasonable person in Hostetler’s 
position might well experience that type of behavior as humiliating, and 
quite possibly threatening. . . . Even the lewd remark . . . was more than a 
casual obscenity. . . . These were not, in sum, petty vulgarities with the 
potential to annoy but not to objectively transform the workplace to a degree 
that implicates Title VII.318 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment: “Holding such acts not to be severe as a matter of law is 
another way of saying that no reasonable person could think them 
serious enough to alter the plaintiff’s work environment.”319 In the case 
at hand, “[a] factfinder reasonably could interpret the alleged course 
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of conduct as sufficiently invasive, humiliating, and threatening to 
poison Hostetler’s working environment.”320 Hostetler is an admirably 
clear and thoughtful application of the reasonable person standard 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift.321 
b. Smith v. Sheahan  
Smith v. Sheahan, which has been cited 204 times, involved a 
prison guard in the Cook County Jail, Ronald Gamble, who violently 
assaulted a fellow guard, Valeria Smith, calling her a “bitch,” 
threatening to “fuck [her] up,” and pinning her against a wall while 
twisting her wrist so severely she needed corrective surgery to repair 
her ligaments.322 Gamble was convicted of criminal battery and placed 
under court supervision, but when Smith complained to her employer, 
she was advised to “kiss and make up.”323 The trial court awarded 
summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that the incidents 
were “too isolated to be actionable.”324 Smith provided affidavits from 
six other female guards recounting a total of seven incidents where 
Gamble was verbally abusive or physically threatening of female 
colleagues.325 After Gamble’s conviction, he was promoted, and Smith 
received a transfer she considered “tantamount to a demotion.”326 The 
trial court granted summary judgment for Gamble, “partially 
discount[ing] the seriousness of Gamble’s misconduct because Smith 
‘voluntarily’ stepped into the ‘aggressive setting’ of the jail.”327 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a “jury would also be 
entitled to conclude that the assault Smith suffered was severe enough 
to alter the terms of her employment even though it was a single 
incident.”328 The court noted that jurors are expected to bring their 
common sense to assess what behavior is appropriate in a given social 
setting.329 The court rejected the defendant’s contention that an assault 
must be sexual to qualify as sexual harassment, pointing out that 
hostile behavior based on sex is prohibited by Title VII even when the 
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behavior is not sexual. The court also rejected the employer’s 
contention that Smith consented to violence by choosing to work in 
the “aggressive setting” of a jail.330  
While both Hostetler and Smith involve extreme behavior—far 
beyond what occurs in most sexual harassment cases or what Supreme 
Court precedent requires to sustain a case—both signal a healthy 
respect for the role of the jury in cases where the touchstone is what a 
reasonable person would consider inappropriate workplace behavior.  
D. The Sixth Circuit: Bowman v. Shawnee State University and Its 
Progeny 
1.  Bowman v. Shawnee State University 
Bowman v. Shawnee State University is a Sixth Circuit opinion 
involving sexual harassment of a man by a woman that has been cited 
712 times.331 As in many of the other cases-in-chief, the judges did not 
allow a jury to decide this case.332 The Sixth Circuit opinion affirmed 
a grant of summary judgment to the employer.333 
Thomas E. Bowman, a part-time instructor teaching health and 
physical education courses, filed sexual harassment claims against 
Shawnee State University and Dr. Jessica J. Jahnke, the then Dean of 
Education.334 At a Christmas party, Jahnke grabbed Bowman’s 
buttocks.335 He said that if someone were to do that to her, she would 
fire him or her, to which she responded that “she controlled his ass and 
she would do whatever she wanted with it.”336 At work, Jahnke rubbed 
his shoulder; he jerked away and said, “No.”337 Jahnke kept calling him 
at home and twice invited Bowman to her house to go with her into 
her whirlpool and her swimming pool; she propositioned him 
repeatedly, ignoring his clear statements that he was not interested.338 
When Bowman confronted Jahnke, she accused him of lying, put her 
finger on his chest, and pushed him towards the door; he responded, 
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“This is the last time you’re ever going to touch me.”339 In addition to 
the sexual harassment allegations, Bowman also alleged that she 
treated him differently because of his sex, imposing requirements on 
him that she did not impose on women.340 
Bowman reflects three outdated norms: (1) that groping and 
persistent sexual comments and propositions do not necessarily 
constitute sexual harassment; (2) that (instead of zero tolerance) 
employers are free to allow supervisors to grope and proposition those 
they supervise; and (3) that only women can be sexually harassed.  
Like Mendoza, Bowman involved sexual harassment with a 
strong undercurrent of abusive bullying. In addition to the sexual 
harassment, Bowman alleged that Jahnke: wrote a memorandum 
chastising Bowman for missing a class when he had not done so; 
chastised him for missing a meeting that was not required and was 
scheduled at a time he was teaching; and asked him to come over to 
her house and repair her deck.341 The court acknowledged that the 
defendant “tormented” the plaintiff, but it treated this as irrelevant to 
his sexual harassment claim.342 But researchers in sociology, 
management science, psychology, and human resources journals have 
documented that sometimes sexual harassment is part and parcel of a 
pattern of aggression and bullying.343 The #MeToo movement and 
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some courts have added an important dimension, highlighting that 
sexual harassment is, at its core, about the abuse of power.344 All this 
should inform courts’ discussions of bullying as part of a pattern of 
sexual harassment in the future.  
The Bowman court discounted much of the evidence presented 
on the grounds that Bowman had not shown that the non-sexual 
conduct he complains of had anything to do with his gender.345 While 
he may have been subject to intimidation, ridicule, and mistreatment, 
he did not show that he was treated in a discriminatory manner because 
he was male.346  
In cases involving women, plaintiffs have not been required to 
prove that the reason for sexual behavior toward them was that they 
were women, and it is not clear what such proof would look like.347 
Does a boss have to announce, “I am grabbing your butt (or making 
you fix my deck) because you are a woman/man”?  
The Bowman court’s incredulity in the face of the argument that 
a man could be the subject of sexual harassment and its consequent 
imposition of a double standard are both inconsistent with newer 
understandings of sexual harassment incident to #MeToo. While most 
of the early highly publicized cases of sexual harassment involved 
women, more recent stories have highlighted that people of all genders 
encounter sexual harassment.348 The belief that sexually harassed men 
just “got lucky” perpetuates harmful stereotypes of men as always 
ready for sex and women as always coy. The Supreme Court has 
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decried this kind of gender stereotyping since the 1970s—for men as 
well as women.349  
The trial court found that the Christmas party incident, the 
whirlpool incident, and the swimming pool incident were sufficiently 
imbued with a sexual flavor to be sexual harassment, but that the 
harassment was “not nearly as severe or pervasive” as in earlier cases 
where no sexual harassment had been found, including one case that 
involved battery.350 This is a classic example of the infinite regression 
of anachronism where, again, the court relied on past cases without 
making the core reasonableness inquiry required by the Supreme 
Court.351 
2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Bowman to Ratchet Up the 
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Sixth Circuit 
Subsequent cases have cited Bowman to deprive plaintiffs of 
their right to have a jury assess whether a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s shoes would find an environment hostile. In the 2003 case 
of Hudson v. M.S. Carriers, Inc., the plaintiff was harassed by her 
supervisor’s boss.352 He asked her what kind of panties she was 
wearing; told her about going to a strip club and swiping the stripper’s 
rear end with his credit card; and called her into his office to show her 
his “fake penis,” which was a pencil which he put close to his 
genitals.353 Twice, he took off his shoes and touched the plaintiff with 
his feet, and once, he wetted his finger and stuck it in her ear, saying 
he wanted to “make Oreo cookies,” which she understood to mean he 
desired sex.354 On numerous other occasions, he touched her in an 
“offensive and unwanted manner.”355  
The court cited Bowman for the proposition that a hostile work 
environment exists when the workplace is “permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment 
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and create an abusive working environment.”356 Relaying the facts of 
Bowman, the court stated that the behavior was “boorish” but not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to survive summary judgment.357 The 
court went on to state that just because some of the incidents involved 
physical invasion, that “[did] not in and of itself militate a finding of 
hostile environment.”358 Consequently, the court granted summary 
judgment for the employer.359 
In the 2009 case of Talley v. United Parcel Service, the 
plaintiff’s coworker harassed her.360 Once he “look[ed] at her private 
area” and asked her “when you going to leave that old man and get 
some of this sexy bowleggedness?”361 Twice he rubbed the plaintiff’s 
arm, once while looking at her private parts and saying “you know you 
got some money.”362 An unspecified number of times, he looked at the 
plaintiff’s “private area” and said inappropriate things and was 
generally flirtatious.363 The court cited Bowman and stated that in the 
present case, the conduct was comparable or less frequent and severe 
than in Bowman.364 The court said that “[a]lthough it appear[ed] [the] 
flirtatious or inappropriate behavior occurred more frequently than the 
three instances of harassment th[e] Plaintiff specifically allege[d], this 
behavior also appear[ed] to be less severe.”365 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff did not allege that any of the behavior was physically 
threatening.366 Thus, the conduct did not rise to the level of severe or 
pervasive harassment sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment 
claim. Once again, the court’s analysis failed to conduct the required 
reasonableness analyses. The court granted the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment.367  
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3. Sixth Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What 
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today  
A case that deserves to be cited more frequently is Williams v. 
General Motors.368 It is already influential, as it has been cited 833 
times.369 Marilyn Williams, who worked for General Motors for more 
than thirty years, alleged that she encountered comments such as “hey 
slut,” “I’m sick and tired of these fucking women,” and “[y]ou left the 
dick out of the hand,” and propositions to “rub up against me anytime” 
and “back right up to me.”370 Williams said she also was subjected to 
constant hazing, such as having a room padlocked while she was 
inside it, having forms glued to the top of her desk, and having 
equipment moved to block entrances she needed to use.371  
Williams points out that after Faragher v. Boca Raton and 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, employers have a duty to take 
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct sexually harassing 
behavior.372 The Sixth Circuit criticized the lower court for dismissing 
the incidents as “infrequent, not severe, not threatening or humiliating, 
but merely offensive.”373 The court also stressed that the “subjective 
test must not be construed as requiring that a plaintiff feel physically 
threatened.”374 This is an important corrective to some courts’ misuse 
of oft-quoted language in Harris v. Forklift listing factors that “may” 
occur in sexual harassment cases.375 The Williams court also correctly 
identified that the comments about sluts and fucking women “could 
be viewed by a jury as humiliating and fundamentally offensive to any 
woman” and “go[t] to the core of Williams’s entitlement to a 
workplace free of discriminatory animus.”376 
Williams also astutely recognized that the hazing behavior 
dismissed by the district court as “pranks” “could well be viewed as 
work-sabotaging behavior that creates a hostile work environment,” 
particularly when accompanied by “threatening language and sexually 
                                                   
 368. See generally Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 
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 370. Williams, 187 F.3d at 559. 
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 372. See id. at 567. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
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aggressive innuendo.”377 Studies of sexual harassment in blue-collar 
jobs report that razzing and hazing is commonplace in such jobs 
(often, but not always, accompanied by inappropriate sexual behavior) 
that can create a hostile work environment.378 
Williams criticized the lower court for having “disaggregated the 
plaintiff’s claims contrary to the Supreme Court’s ‘totality of 
circumstances’ directives, which robbed the incidents of their 
cumulative effect.”379 The issue, said the court, “is not whether each 
incident of harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause 
of action in a hostile environment case, but whether—taken together—
the reported incidents make out such a case.”380 “This totality-of-
circumstances examination should be viewed as the most basic tenet 
of the hostile-work-environment cause of action.”381  
Williams deserves to be even more widely cited than it is. It is 
more consistent than Bowman with Supreme Court precedent and with 
what a reasonable person and jury today would believe constitutes 
sexual harassment. 
E. The Fifth Circuit: Shepherd v. Comptroller and Its Progeny 
1. Shepherd v. Comptroller 
The final case-in-chief is Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public 
Accounts, a Fifth Circuit opinion that has been cited 584 times.382 
Shepherd reflects four outdated norms: (1) that sexualized touching is 
not sexual harassment; (2) that comments, up to and including “your 
elbows are the color of your nipples,” are “mere utterance[s]” that 
women need to take in stride; (3) that sexual harassment is not serious 
unless it is physically threatening; and (4) that (instead of zero 
tolerance) employers are free to tolerate sexual harassment so long as 
it does not “destroy . . . [women’s] opportunity to succeed in the 
workplace.”383  
                                                   
 377. Id. at 564. 
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Plaintiff’s coworker, Jodie Moore, assaulted Debra Jean 
Shepherd for two years after she got engaged to Moore’s brother-in-
law.384 Moore patted his lap and told Shepherd, “[h]ere’s your seat,” 
and announced, “your elbows are the same color as your nipples.”385 
Moore told Shepherd she had big thighs and “simulated looking under 
her dress.”386 He also tried repeatedly to look down her top and stroked 
her arm in an apparently sexual way, rubbing a hand from her shoulder 
down to her wrist.387  
The court noted that “Shepherd testified that Moore never 
propositioned her, asked her out on a date, or suggested that he would 
like to sleep with her.”388 But of course that is irrelevant: Shepherd 
alleged a hostile work environment, not quid pro quo harassment.389 
Irrelevant, too, is that Moore “had a friendly relation” with Shepherd 
outside of work.390 Because Moore was engaged to Shepherd’s 
brother-in-law, Moore could have been under family pressures to keep 
up appearances.391  
Because the employer took prompt and effective remedial 
action, the plaintiff lost.392 But what is troubling—and influential—is 
the court’s holding that Moore’s behavior did not create a hostile 
environment because it was not something a reasonable person might 
find to be sexual harassment.393 “We agree with Shepherd that the 
comments made by Moore were boorish and offensive. The 
comments, however, were not severe.”394 The court wrote off the 
“nipples” comment as a “mere utterance of an epithet that engender[s] 
offensive feelings.”395 The court thereby communicated that women 
should just take such comments in stride.396  
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However, it wasn’t just the comment. The court wrote off the 
physical touching as “too tepid” on the grounds it was not “physically 
threatening.”397 This court, too, misused the language from Harris v. 
Forklift, which merely listed physically threatening conduct as a factor 
that “may” (or may not) exist in sexual harassment cases.398 Again, the 
court relied on the outdated understanding that sexual harassment is 
not serious unless it is downright frightening.399 This is a far cry from 
the controlling standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court, that 
sexual harassment is triggered long before a plaintiff suffers from 
psychological harm.400 
Recall that the “tepid” conduct was a coworker running his hand 
down Shepherd’s arm from her shoulder to her wrist, making 
comments about her nipples, repeatedly trying or miming looking up 
her skirt and down her shirt.401 It is not clear how any of this conduct 
could be read as anything other than sexually aggressive.402 It is highly 
unlikely that a reasonable person or jury would agree with the 
Shepherd court’s conclusion today. 
In a classic example of the infinite regression of anachronism, 
the court compares what happened to Shepherd as “far less 
objectionable” than cases of true and actionable sexual harassment 
involving a female employee who was “sexually groped repeatedly”403 
and an “environment where male coworkers cornered women and 
rubbed their thighs, grabbed their breasts, and held a woman so that a 
man could touch her.”404 This again reflects an era when garden-
variety sexual harassment was viewed as not serious—as something 
any woman worth her salt could and should deal with on her own. 
Assuming that sentiment reflected what a reasonable person or jury 
would have believed in the late 1990s, it does not reflect what they 
likely would believe today.405 
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2. Subsequent Courts Have Used Shepherd to Ratchet Up the 
Standard for Sexual Harassment in the Fifth Circuit 
Shepherd has been widely cited to heighten the standard for 
hostile environment in the Fifth Circuit, which one commentator 
called “perhaps the most aggressive circuit affirming grants of 
summary judgments” in hostile environment cases.406 Shepherd is 
cited in cases that involve threats and sexual assaults far in excess of 
what occurred in Shepherd.407  
In 2004, the Eastern District of Louisiana relied on Shepherd to 
grant summary judgment for the employer in Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Rite Aid Corporation, which involved a 
plaintiff harassed by two co-workers.408 One cupped her breast and 
backed her into a corner of the store three times; asked for her phone 
number and threatened to come to her house (which might well make 
a reasonable woman fear for her safety); commented on her body; and 
told her numerous times that she better not gain weight.409 A second 
coworker also threatened to come to her house and rubbed his finger 
across the back of her neck, causing her to jump.410 He pinched her 
thigh, tried to kiss her, and twice brushed up against her and said, “I 
wonder what it feel [sic] like.”411 He also walked close to her, looked 
her up and down and made remarks under his breath, commented how 
fine and pretty she was, commented how nice her chest was, and asked 
her what she slept in at night.412  
The court, which also had evidence of inappropriate conduct 
towards other female employees, cited Shepherd to say that totality of 
circumstances did not add up to sexual harassment because Title VII 
only bars conduct so severe or pervasive it “destroys . . . [the] 
opportunity to succeed in the workplace.”413 The court excused the 
conduct as merely “offensive and sophomoric” but not severe or 
pervasive enough to alter the terms or conditions of employment.414 
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Despite the sexual assaults by two colleagues, the court said the 
coworker’s conduct was the equivalent to the “‘mere utterance of an 
epithet that engender[s] offensive feelings.”415 The court admitted that 
the conduct was “quite unwelcome” but not severe or physically 
threatening, despite the assaults and threats to come to the plaintiff’s 
house.416 This was not the kind of “extreme conduct” that would render 
a work environment objectively hostile or abusive.417 Despite 
acknowledging that the issue was whether a reasonable jury could find 
a hostile environment, the court inexplicably prevented the extreme 
facts of this case from reaching a jury based on its reading of 
Shepherd.418  
In the 2006 case of Chelette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., yet another plaintiff was harassed by a supervisor, who 
twice tried to kiss the plaintiff when they were alone together in a car 
for business reasons, after she had clearly indicated her lack of 
interest.419 He also talked about his lack of a sex life and asked whether 
she had ever thought about having an affair; commented that another 
co-worker was lucky because he had affairs with young college 
women; brought her a sheer swimsuit as a gift after a trip to Hawaii; 
and kept touching her, including trying to kiss her, massaging her 
shoulder repeatedly, brushing his arm against her breast perhaps more 
than ten times.420 He stared at her breasts; commented that “she was 
proportioned nicely” and her husband was lucky; and “commented 
about her body and how he liked to watch her walk away.”421 The court 
relayed the facts of Shepherd as one of several comparison cases and 
said the allegations in the present case “simply do not rise to the level 
of severe or pervasive conduct required for recovery.”422 The court 
granted summary judgment for the employer.423 
One year later, Hancock v. Barron Builders & Management 
Company, Inc. involved three plaintiffs alleging harassment by the 
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company president.424 The president described his use of sex toys and 
demonstrated which positions he preferred; discussed having sex with 
his wife, referring to her in terms too “demeaning” to be repeated by 
the court; talked about videotaping his sexual encounters; talked about 
the number of sex partners he had; graphically described situations 
where he date-raped women in college; asked for an opinion on 
Hispanics as sexual partners; requested one plaintiff come to his house 
in a bikini; and once entered the plaintiff’s office and began to take off 
his shirt.425 The court cited Shepherd to write off this conduct as 
“[o]ccasional comments, discourtesy, rudeness, or isolated incidents” 
that, “unless extremely serious,” were insufficient to establish sexual 
harassment.426 “Title VII is intended only to prohibit . . . conduct . . . ’ 
so severe or pervasive that it destroys . . . opportunity to succeed in 
the workplace,’” asserted the court—a standard inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court standard of reasonableness.427 The president’s 
comments were “boorish and offensive” but “not so severe or 
pervasive as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiffs’ 
employment,” said the court, granting summary judgment for the 
employer.428 
Another 2007 case, Combs v. Exxon Mobile Corporation, 
involved a plaintiff harassed by a co-worker who pressed his genitals 
against her buttocks, touched her breasts, and tried to hug her.429 He 
also asked “do you want me?” more than three times; asked why the 
plaintiff didn’t find him attractive; told her he “wanted her” and that 
she aroused him; told her that he dreamt about her at night; said, “I 
wish I was the sweat that rolls down your neck between your breasts”; 
told her frequently, “I don’t know why I want to have sex with you”; 
told her he could wear down her determination to have a platonic 
relationship; and told her, “that sweat looks so good, I can lick the 
sweat off of you.”430 The court admitted that the conduct was 
“sophomoric” and “to a reasonable person the conduct would be quite 
unwelcome” but cited Shepherd to support its conclusion that it was 
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not sufficiently severe, pervasive, or physically threatening enough to 
alter the conditions of employment.431 This both ratchets up the “severe 
or pervasive” inquiry to “threatening” and ignores the Harris 
reasonableness requirement.432 The court granted summary judgment 
to the employer.433 
3. Fifth Circuit Case Law More Consistent with What 
Reasonable People and Juries Would Likely Find Today  
A Fifth Circuit case, cited 637 times, that is more in tune with 
what reasonable people and juries would likely find today is Harvill 
v. Westward Communications.434 The plaintiff, Harvill, was the office 
manager at a newspaper who alleged sexual harassment by Oscar 
Rogers, who operated a commercial printing press at the newspaper’s 
offices.435 The plaintiff alleged that Rogers had “grabbed her and 
kissed her on the cheek, popped rubber bands at her breasts, fondled 
her breasts ‘numerous times,’ patted her . . . buttocks ‘numerous 
times,’ [had] c[o]me [up] behind her and rubbed his body against her” 
and had “made comments . . . about her sex life and her abilities in 
bed.”436 “Undoubtedly, the deliberate and unwanted touching of 
Harvill’s intimate body parts [could] constitute severe sexual 
harassment,” noted the court, rejecting the trial court’s finding that 
Harvill’s allegations were “too conclusory” because she could not 
name the precise number of times she had been touched, fondled, and 
grabbed.437  
This is a welcome contrast to Brooks v. City of San Mateo.438 
“The Supreme Court,” continued the Fifth Circuit, “has stated that 
isolated incidents, if egregious, can alter the terms and conditions of 
employment.”439 The Harvill court corrected the district court’s 
mistake of requiring that the harassing conduct alleged to be both 
severe and pervasive, which is a clear misreading of Supreme Court 
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precedent.440 The court also held that a reasonable jury might find the 
conduct sufficiently pervasive, noting that “Harvill estimated that 
Rogers touched her breasts or her buttocks perhaps as often as once a 
week—although she later stated that it may not have been as often as 
once a week.”441 
The Harvill court also was clear about the role of the judge and 
jury: “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Harvill, the 
non-movant, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that 
Rogers’[s] conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term 
or condition of Harvill’s employment.”442  
Harvill provides an important tool that judges in the Fifth Circuit 
can use to forge a new path in cases that involve employees subjected 
to unwanted sexual comments and behavior at work.  
F. Conclusion 
These five cases-in-chief are nineteen to twenty-four years old, 
yet they have been very influential in ratcheting up the standards for 
what constitutes a hostile work environment. This ratcheting-up effect 
becomes particularly obvious when one sees how the sub-cases have 
used the cases-in-chief to keep hostile environment cases away from 
juries and substitute judges’ own opinions about what a reasonable 
person would consider a hostile work environment. Each of the cases-
in-chief no longer reflects what most Americans believe today. Judges 
should step out of the way and let the jury system do its work, updating 
the law on sexual harassment in the light of the norm cascade 
represented by #MeToo. 
IV. THE “REASONABLENESS” OF NDAS THAT BAR SURVIVORS FROM 
DISCLOSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT  
As demonstrated in Parts II and III above, the norm cascade 
prompted by #MeToo has fundamentally altered what’s reasonable 
now in sexual harassment cases.443 New norms about what’s 
reasonable also have implications for nondisclosure agreements 
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(NDAs) that affect whether plaintiffs can bring their claims forward.444 
NDAs (or confidentiality agreements) are contractual agreements to 
keep certain specified information secret.445 NDAs executed in the 
employment context are enforceable only to the extent that they are 
“reasonable”446 based on a weighing of factors discussed below.447 In 
this Part, we propose a framework for evaluating the “reasonableness” 
of sexual harassment NDAs, and we explain how the norm cascade 
should influence courts’ analyses of whether they can be reasonably 
enforced. 
A. The “Reasonableness” Standard 
It is a “bedrock” principle of contract law that a promise is 
unenforceable if important public policy interests outweigh the 
interest in enforcing the agreement.448 While the law generally permits 
employers and employees to agree to contractual constraints on their 
own speech,449 courts have recognized that restricting the free flow of 
information in this way potentially implicates a number of public 
policy concerns.450 Consequently, employment-related NDAs are 
typically enforced only to the extent that they are “reasonable.”451 
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There is “no mathematical formula” for ascertaining reasonableness.452 
“Ultimately, the task of determining reasonableness is one of 
balancing competing interests . . . . Each case must be determined on 
its own particular facts . . . .”453 Factors courts commonly considered 
in determining whether an NDA is “reasonable” include: the extent of 
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interest” (citing Merrimack Valley Wood Prods. v. Near,  
876 A.2d 757, 762 (N.H. 2005))); Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 
174 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring nondisclosure and noncompete agreements to be 
reasonable in time and scope); AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F. 
Supp. 685, 692 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (“In determining the enforceability of specific 
nondisclosure clauses, courts must be satisfied with the reasonableness of the 
clauses.”); see also Snepp v. U.S., 444 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that nondisclosure agreements “are enforceable only if they can survive 
scrutiny under the ‘rule of reason’”); Henry Hope X-Ray Prods. v. Marron Carrel, 
Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the relevant state law that 
nondisclosure agreements must be reasonable); Bodemer v. Swanel Beverage, Inc., 
884 F. Supp. 2d 717, 734 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (“[C]onfidentiality agreements ‘must be 
reasonable with respect to the legitimate interests of the employer, restrictions on the 
employee, and the public interest.’”); Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. Baum, 629 F.Supp. 
466, 468 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the reasonableness of a NDA depends on “whether 
enforcement of the covenant will injure the public, whether enforcement will cause 
undue hardship to the promisor and whether the restraint imposed by the covenant is 
greater than is necessary to protect the interests of the employer”); Newinno, Inc. v. 
Peregrim Dev., Inc., 2003 WL 21493838, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 2003) 
(holding that an NDA, like a non-compete agreement, is valid and enforceable only if 
it is reasonable); Follmer, Rudzewics & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Mich. 
1984) (holding that courts must “scrutinize” an NDA to determine whether “it goes 
beyond what is reasonably necessary for the protection of confidential 
information . . . .”); 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D. 1981) 
(holding that NDAs “are strictly construed and enforced only to the extent reasonably 
necessary to protect the employer’s interest in confidential information”). 
 452. Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D. 
1996); accord Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., 565 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1989) 
(“[T]he court adopted the Restatement’s approach that reasonableness was 
determined by balancing the employer’s need to protect a legitimate interest with the 
hardship to the employee and injury to the public.”). 
 453. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d at 521.  
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the restraint,454 the employer’s interest in maintaining secrecy,455 the 
employee’s interest in disclosure,456 and the public’s interest in 
disclosure.457  
The flexibility and factual sensitivity of the “reasonableness” 
test is well suited to address the different, commonly used types of 
sexual harassment NDAs and the different contexts in which they are 
adopted and invoked to prevent disclosures.458 NDAs differ along three 
key dimensions: (1) their breadth of coverage;459 (2) the extent to 
which they are adopted voluntarily;460 and (3) the legal context in 
which they are adopted.461 First, NDAs differ in their breadth or 
                                                   
 454. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Tr. & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 
563 (4th Cir. 1990) (considering whether constraint is “no broader than is necessary” 
to protect the employer); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 836 F.Supp.2d 
1203, 1223 (D. Kan. 2011) (considering geographic restrictions on NDAs); Shepherd 
v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) 
(considering duration and geographic restrictions on NDAs); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. 
Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) 
(considering geographic restrictions on NDAs); Prudential Ins., 629 F.Supp. at 471 
(finding that a non-disclosure agreement was overbroad). 
 455. See Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1244 (considering employer’s need for 
protection from covered disclosures); Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 
1060, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (considering the employer’s need for an NDA). 
 456. See, e.g., Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1247 (considering impact of NDA on 
employee’s ability to earn a living); Eden Hannon, 914 F.2d at 563 (considering 
whether restraint is “unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts 
of th[e] [promisor] to conduct its business”); Buckley, 425 N.E.2d at 1065 
(considering whether the NDA will cause “undue hardship” on the 
employee/promisor). 
 457. See, e.g., Shepherd, 25 A.3d 1233, 1233 (holding that the employee 
would suffer if the agreement is enforced); Eden Hannon, 914 F.2d at 563 
(considering whether the restraint is “reasonable from the standpoint of sound public 
policy”); Buckley, 425 N.E.2d at 1065 (considering whether enforcement of the NDA 
“will injure the public”). 
 458. See supra notes 448-457 and accompanying text (discussing the 
flexibility of the “reasonableness” standard). 
 459. See generally Maxwell S. Kennerly, Sexual Harassment and the 
Enforcement of Non-Disclosure Agreements, LITIG. & TRIAL BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2018/01/articles/attorney/sexual-harassment-nda/ 
[https://perma.cc/LRR7-RSC5]. 
 460. See Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the 
Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure 
Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2524-25 (2018) (discussing 
that voluntariness is a limited concept with various limitations). 
 461. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Blame Nondisparagment Clauses,  
Not Settlements for Concealing the Most Sexual Misconduct, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blame-nondisparagement-clauses-not-
settlements-for-concealing-the-most-sexual-misconduct-2017-12-06 
[https://perma.cc/JG4G-KF34 ] (reporting that non-disparagement agreements—not 
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specificity of coverage.462 For instance, some employers require 
employees to sign broad anti-disparagement NDAs that do not 
mention sexual harassment explicitly but forbid employees from 
making any statement that could harm the employer’s reputation.463 
Some have interpreted such anti-disparagement NDAs to encompass 
disclosures about sexual harassment.464 Indeed, this was long the 
position of the Weinstein Company, which forced employees to sign 
broad anti-disparagement agreements and used them for many years 
to silence Harvey Weinstein’s accusers.465 By contrast, some NDAs 
are more narrowly tailored to forbid disclosures about specific 
instances of harassment.466 Such distinctions may bear on their 
reasonableness.467 
Second, NDAs vary in the extent to which they are adopted 
voluntarily by the signing employee.468 Some are negotiated explicitly 
between the employer and the signing employee, while others are 
imposed by the employer as a condition of employment or a condition 
of resolving any sexual harassment claim.469 As a general matter, 
employees negotiating explicitly for confidentiality terms are likely to 
have more power and agency than those on whom terms are imposed 
as a condition of employment.470 However, negotiating employees 
differ radically in their income, education, and job security, all of 
which affect their ability to bargain meaningfully for silence about 
                                                   
settlement agreements—were the greatest impediment to revealing sexual harassment 
by Weinstein). 
 462. See Kennerly, supra note 459. 
 463. See id. (reporting that the Weinstein Company required employees to 
sign broad waivers forbidding critical comments that could damage the company’s 
“business reputation”).  
 464. See id. 
 465. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Blame Nondisparagment Clauses,  
Not Settlements for Concealing the Most Sexual Misconduct, MARKETWATCH, (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blame-nondisparagement-clauses-not-
settlements-for-concealing-the-most-sexual-misconduct-2017-12-06 
https://perma.cc/M7X5-U63E (reporting that non-disparagement agreements—not 
settlement agreements—were the greatest impediment to revealing sexual harassment 
by Weinstein). 
 466. See generally id. (explaining that some non-disparagement clauses may 
be narrow). 
 467. See id. (stating that the specificity of a non-disparagement agreement 
turns on its reasonableness). 
 468. See Prasad, supra note 460, at 2524-25 (discussing that voluntariness is 
a limited concept with various limitations). 
 469. See id. at 2521. 
 470. See id. (noting the unequal power dynamic between an employee and 
potential employee in the context of an NDA). 
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sexual harassment. Such distinctions may be relevant to their 
reasonableness.471 
Third, NDAs are adopted against different legal backdrops.472 
Some are adopted to resolve pending or threatened litigation, while 
others are adopted outside the litigation context to resolve sexual 
harassment complaints raised informally through an employer’s 
internal channels.473 Whether an NDA is reasonable may depend, in 
part, on what it contains and how it was adopted. 
In addition, the reasonableness of enforcing a particular NDA 
might also depend on the context in which a potentially covered 
disclosure occurs. For instance, existing case law treats disclosures 
made to a court or regulatory agency differently than disclosures made 
to the general public outside these legal fora.474 Below we outline the 
legal framework for evaluating the “reasonableness” of NDAs and 
discuss how it is likely to apply in cases where employers attempt to 
use them to prevent public disclosures by survivors of sexual 
harassment. 
B. NDAs that Forbid Disclosure in Court or to Regulators Are Not 
Reasonable 
In the context of legal proceedings, courts have definitively 
struck the “reasonableness” balance to allow disclosures of sexual 
harassment that would otherwise be covered by an NDA.475 Case law 
clearly establishes that NDAs cannot be enforced to bar individuals 
from disclosing information about harassment in judicial proceedings 
or to regulators at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC).476 Longstanding common law doctrine holds that agreements 
to suppress evidence in judicial proceedings are void as contrary to 
                                                   
 471. See Tippett, supra note 461. 
 472. See id. (discussing how some NDAs are entered while litigation is 
ongoing and some are entered into as a common place procedure in the workplace). 
 473. See id. 
 474. See infra Section IV.B (discussing that NDA’s cannot be enforced to bar 
individuals from disclosing information about harassment in judicial proceedings or 
to regulators at the EEOC).  
 475. See, e.g., Kennerly, supra note 459 (stating that NDAs that prohibit 
disclosure of sexual harassment have been found to violate federal law). 
 476. See Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on 
Sexual Harassment Claims, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017) (“NDAs cannot lawfully 
prevent people from reporting claims to law enforcement and government agencies, 
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the US.”). 
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public policy.477 Consistent with this principle, courts have held that an 
NDA cannot be enforced to prevent individuals from providing 
evidence about sexual harassment in judicial proceedings.478 As one 
court explained, evidence about prior sexual harassment claims settled 
by an employer is “highly relevant” to resolving hostile environment 
claims, since hostile environment plaintiffs must establish the severity 
or pervasiveness of the conduct and the employer’s knowledge and 
handling of it.479 Public policy strongly favors allowing such probative 
evidence into judicial proceedings.480 In weighing competing interests, 
the court opined that the “plaintiff’s interest in being free from 
unlawful discrimination in the workplace, coupled with the public’s 
interest in the eradication of discrimination, outweighs [the 
employer’s] interest in maintaining the confidentiality of 
the . . . settlement agreement.”481  
Another court that allowed testimony of prior sexual harassment 
in spite of an NDA prohibiting it observed that the public’s “concern 
grows more pressing as additional individuals are harmed by identical 
or similar action.”482 In light of these concerns, courts have concluded 
that enforcing sexual harassment NDAs in the context of judicial 
                                                   
 477. See, e.g., Harris v. Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (N.D. Ca. 
2003) (“Agreements to suppress evidence have been held void as against public 
policy.” (quoting Williamson v. Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 131 (Cal. 1978))). 
 478. See Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365 (D. Nev. 1993) (refusing 
to enforce an NDA to prevent previous victims of sexual harassment at defendant 
company from providing evidence in current sexual harassment lawsuit because it 
“would condone the practice of ‘buy[ing] the silence of a witness with a settlement 
agreement’”); Denise Rich Songs, Inc. v. Hester, 2004 WL 2563702, at *5 (N. Y. Sup. 
Ct. Oct. 4, 2004) (finding that employer had no cause of action for breach of a 
confidentiality agreement by a former employee who had disclosed information in 
violation of that agreement in connection with an employment discrimination 
lawsuit); Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
2002) (refusing to enforce an NDA to prevent previous victims of sexual harassment 
at defendant company from providing evidence in current sexual harassment lawsuit); 
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lee, 28 P.3d 413, 419 (Kan. App. 2001) (refusing to enforce 
an NDA signed by a former employee to settle an employment discrimination claim 
in a subsequent case, allowing the former employee to present “nonconfidential, 
truthful information . . . in connection with a claim against his former employer”). See 
also Waterson v. Plank Road Motel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 284, 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(allowing testimony by a former employee who settled a harassment complaint against 
the same employer because the probative value of the testimony outweighed the 
employer’s interest in secrecy). 
 479. Llerena, 845 A.2d at 739. 
 480. See id. (stating that the judiciary’s role includes preventing exclusion of 
probative evidence in the interest of discovering the truth).  
 481. Id. at 739. 
 482. Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 366. 
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proceedings would “undermine[] not only individual third-party 
plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate their rights but the judicial system 
itself.”483 Consequently, they have consistently ordered that plaintiffs 
be provided with information about prior instances of sexual 
harassment at the defendant company, even when such instances are 
covered by NDAs.484 
Courts similarly have held that NDAs cannot be enforced to bar 
the provision of information about sexual harassment to the EEOC in 
the context of an investigation.485 In EEOC v. Astra USA, the court 
explained that Congress had statutorily commanded the EEOC “to 
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment 
discrimination” and allowing employers to prohibit communications 
with the agency would hobble its ability to investigate discrimination 
complaints and harm the public interest.486 The court rejected the 
employer’s argument that the strong public policy interest in 
settlement supported the full enforcement of settlement agreements, 
including non-disclosure terms.487 The court found this interest 
insignificant when weighed against “public policy [that] so clearly 
favors the free flow of information between victims of harassment and 
the agency entrusted with righting the wrongs inflicted upon them.”488 
Accordingly, the court held that employees who had signed NDAs 
with the employer being investigated could nonetheless respond to 
questions from EEOC investigators and volunteer information 
concerning sexual harassment at their employer to the EEOC.489  
                                                   
 483. Lee, 28 P.3d at 420. 
 484. See Meena Yoo, SEC Disclosures: Balancing Investor Rights with 
Privacy Rights, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (May 7, 2018), 
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/05/07/sec-disclosures-balancing-investor-
rights-with-privacy-rights/#_edn6 [https://perma.cc/V6MY-GMPX] (stating that 
courts have generally found that companies have an affirmative duty to disclose 
sexual harassment allegations). 
 485. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 
738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating the Congress’s investigatory powers would be 
seriously curtailed if victims of sexual harassment cannot approach the EEOC). In 
another context, a federal district court suggested that there is a constitutional right to 
inform the government of violations of federal laws, and that under the Supremacy 
Clause, U.S. Constitution Art. VI, this right supersedes local tort or contract rights. 
See Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 486. Astra USA, Inc. at 744 (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980)). 
 487. See id. at 745. 
 488. Id. 
 489. See id. 
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While the existing case law holding NDAs unenforceable in 
judicial and regulatory fora covers many of the disclosures likely to be 
made by survivors who sign sexual harassment-related NDAs, other 
types of disclosures do not fit squarely within this case law. For a 
variety of reasons, many survivors choose not to pursue legal action.490 
Sexual harassment lawsuits are costly, lengthy, uncertain, and 
emotionally grueling for plaintiffs.491 There is a pervasive sense that 
“the law often fails to prevent and correct sexual harassment.”492 
Indeed, the revelations of #MeToo suggest that a generation of sexual 
harassment lawsuits failed to produce meaningful social change in 
workplace norms and behaviors. Thus, many survivors may look to 
channels outside of formal legal institutions to air grievances, 
including friends and family, “whisper networks” of other survivors 
and potential targets of harassment, social media, conventional media, 
or other public fora.493  
Case law on disclosures to courts and regulators does not 
squarely address these kinds of public disclosures. Public disclosures 
differ from disclosures before judicial and administrative bodies in 
important ways. Disclosures made outside of legal institutions do not 
implicate the fundamental fairness and integrity of those institutions, 
nor can they be shielded from widespread public dissemination by 
protective orders guarding parties and third parties from unnecessary 
publicity and embarrassment, as often occurs in legal proceedings.494 
While these distinctions suggest that case law on legal disclosures 
cannot be applied directly to extralegal public disclosures, Section C 
below explains that they do not necessarily tip the balance in favor of 
enforcing sexual harassment NDAs against survivors who wish to 
                                                   
 490. See, e.g., Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and 
the Contract of Silence, GENDER POL’Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017), 
http://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosure-agreements-sexual-harassment-
and-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/J96A-YL8L] (noting that NDAs may, 
in some instances, help survivors of sexual harassment). 
 491. See id. 
 492. Id.  
 493. See Hill, supra note 490. 
 494. See, e.g., Dunn v. Warhol, No. 91-4169, 1992 WL 102744, at *1-2 (E.D. 
Pa. May 8, 1992) (holding that the plaintiff had “articulated persuasive reasons why 
the dissemination of this highly personal information could cause not only serious 
embarrassment but also severe emotional damage to her and her family” thereby 
justifying a protective order); Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 739 (N.J. 
Super. Law Div. 2002) (refusing to enforce NDA to prevent employee who had settled 
a harassment claim from providing testimony for plaintiff in a harassment suit against 
their mutual employer but granting a protective order to protect the testifying 
employee’s privacy). 
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speak.495 Instead, courts must inquire into the reasonableness of 
enforcing sexual harassment NDAs to prevent extra-legal disclosures 
on a case-by-case basis. 
C. A Framework for Evaluating the Reasonableness of NDAs to 
Forbid Extralegal Disclosures of Sexual Harassment 
As laid out above, the reasonableness of an employment-related 
NDA depends on a balancing of factors, including: the extent of the 
restraint,496 the employer’s interest in maintaining secrecy,497 the 
employee’s interest in disclosure,498 and the public’s interest in 
disclosure.499 To our knowledge, no existing case has applied this 
framework to a sexual harassment NDA. Drawing on case law in 
analogous contexts, this Section discusses how each factor should be 
analyzed to determine the reasonableness of sexual harassment 
NDAs.500 Based on a balancing of the relevant interests, we argue that 
NDAs generally should not be enforced to silence survivors who wish 
to publicly discuss their harassment outside of legal proceedings. 
However, we acknowledge that there are legitimate countervailing 
                                                   
 495. See infra Section IV.C (explaining that courts have been using a 
balancing approach to enforcing NDAs by looking at factors such as the interests of 
the employer, employee, and the general public). 
 496. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 
556, 563 (4th Cir. 1990) (considering whether constraint is “no broader than is 
necessary” to protect the employer); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 836 
F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (D. Kan. 2011); Prudential Ins. V. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 
471 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that an NDA was overbroad and unenforceable); 
Shepherd v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) 
(considering duration and geographic restrictions in determining reasonableness of an 
NDA); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 491 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
 497. See, e.g., Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1981); Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1244 (considering employer’s need for 
protection from covered disclosures). 
 498. See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co., 914 F.2d at 563 (considering whether 
restraint is “unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts of th[e] 
[promisor] to conduct its business”); Tower Oil, 425 N.E.2d at 1065 (considering 
whether the NDA will cause “undue hardship” on the employee/promisor); Shepherd, 
25 A.3d at 1247 (considering impact of NDA on employee’s ability to earn a living). 
 499. See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co., 914 F.2d at 563 (considering whether the 
restraint is “reasonable from the standpoint of sound public policy”); Tower Oil & 
Tech. Co., 425 N.E.2d at 1065 (considering whether enforcement of the NDA “will 
injure the public”); Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1247. 
 500. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the extent of restraint, interests of the 
employer in protecting business secrets, interests of the discloser, and interests of the 
general public). 
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interests that should be taken into account, including the interests that 
many survivors have in confidentiality. We argue that the 
“reasonableness” test provides courts with the flexibility to 
accommodate competing interests and to adapt to changed 
circumstances over time as the law and the facts on the ground develop 
in this nascent area.  
1. Extent of Restraint 
Courts do not favor enforcing broad, undifferentiated restrictions 
contained in NDAs, confidentiality agreements, or restraints on trade 
more generally.501 The general rule is that “covenants that are 
functionally overbroad are unreasonable and void as a matter of 
law.”502 Courts typically require NDAs to identify with specificity the 
type of information the employee may not disclose.503 Courts will 
refuse to enforce overbroad NDAs or will narrowly tailor such 
covenants if they choose to enforce them.504 For instance, courts have 
refused to enforce a non-solicitation clause that contained “no 
additional limiting language or circumstances in the case that 
otherwise would limit the scope of the restriction.”505 Courts also 
commonly read temporal or geographic limitations into agreements 
lacking them.506 This standard of narrow tailoring should bar the use 
                                                   
 501. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing that broad confidentiality agreements constitute unreasonable restraints 
on trade), superseded by statute, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/8 (1999); Prudential Ins. 
Co. Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (“Nondisclosure covenants 
adjudged overbroad are considered an unfair restraint upon competition.”); SI 
Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (“[A]ny 
agreement which seeks to restrict post-employment activities is subject to the same 
standards [as noncompetition clauses].”); Whelan Security Co. v. Kennebrew, 379 
S.W.3d 835, 843 (Mo. 2012) (citing the proposition that restrictive covenants must be 
narrowly tailored to be enforceable); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206, 
211 (Kan. 1984) (stating that enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement “would 
unreasonably infringe upon appellant’s right to earn a living”). 
 502. Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 535 (E.D. Va. 
2012) (reviewing a Separation Agreement for ambiguity to determine if it was 
overbroad). 
 503. See id. 
 504. See Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1276 
(N.H. 1997) (citing the principle that courts will narrowly tailor covenants not to 
compete by geographic scope, duration, and regarding only legitimate employer 
interests).  
 505. Whelan Security, 379 S.W.3d at 843 (finding the non-solicitation clause 
unenforceable because it was “unreasonably overbroad”).  
 506. See Concord Orthopaedics, 702, A.2d at 1276. 
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of broad anti-disparagement NDAs that do not contain scope 
restrictions of any kind against sexual harassment survivors who wish 
to speak.  
2. Employer Interests 
The speech restrictions contained in an employment-related 
NDA are enforceable only to the extent “reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the employer.”507 An employer cannot simply assert a 
bald preference for secrecy but rather must assert a “legitimate and 
substantial business justification” for the speech restriction.508 “[I]n 
cases where the employer’s interests do not rise to the level of a 
proprietary interest deserving of judicial protection, a court will 
conclude that a restrictive agreement merely stifles competition and 
therefore is unenforceable.”509 Traditionally, courts have found 
employers’ interests in protecting trade secrets to provide the highest 
and plainest justification for confidentiality,510 although even these 
core interests are not absolute and remain subject to a balance of other 
                                                   
 507. Shepherd, 25 A.3d at 1244; see also PharMethod, Inc. v. Caserta, 382 
Fed. App’x. 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A restrictive covenant is reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the employer when it is narrowly tailored to protect an employer’s 
legitimate interests.”); HR Staffing Consultants, LLC v. Butts, No. 2:15-3155, 2015 
WL 3492609, at *12 (D.N.J. June 2, 2015), aff’d, 627 F. App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that a non-compete limiting the defendant’s ability to work in five New 
Jersey counties only for a period of one year was narrowly tailored to ensure the 
covenant is no broader than necessary to protect the employer’s interests); Campbell 
Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488-89 (D.N.J. 1999) (“Under New Jersey 
law, . . . [t]o minimize the hardship imposed on the employee, the geographic, 
temporal and subject-matter restrictions of an otherwise enforceable agreement not to 
compete will be enforced only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the 
employer’s legitimate business interests.”) (citations omitted).  
 508. Banner Health Sys. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 851 F.3d 35, 41 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017); accord Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., 565 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1989) 
(employer must assert a “legitimate interest”).  
 509. Ingersoll–Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 892, 894 (N.J. 1988) 
(finding that since “[t]he line between [protectable] information, trade secrets, and the 
general skills and knowledge of a highly sophisticated employee will be very difficult 
to draw,” courts are expected to “narrowly” construe an employer’s need for 
protection); see also GPS Indus., LLC v. Lewis, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1333 (M.D. 
Fla. 2010) (citing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(h) (2019) (indicating that Florida courts 
“construe a restrictive covenant narrowly, against the restraint or against the drafter 
where legitimate business interests have been established”). 
 510. See generally Bodemer v. Swanel Beverage, 884 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. 
Ind. 2012).  
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interests.511 Courts also give solicitude to employer interests in the 
secrecy of confidential business information—for instance, customer 
lists or business strategy—that may not qualify for trade secret 
protection.512 
These core interests do not necessarily exhaust the universe of 
protectable interests.513 Courts will look to the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case to assess the legitimacy of the 
employer’s asserted interest.514 Such ad hoc analysis has not yielded 
clear rules or bright lines around what constitutes a protected employer 
interest. However, the logic of the existing case law suggests that 
employment-related NDAs can be used to protect only the employer’s 
legitimate business interests.515  
The term “business interest” is not well defined in the case law, 
but the legitimacy of a “business interest” in secrecy often turns on 
whether the disclosure of covered information would cause the 
employer “competitive harm.”516 The prospect of competitive harm is 
clearly present when an employee threatens to provide a competitor 
with confidential information about the employer’s business strategy, 
                                                   
 511. See Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv. Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1978) 
 512. See, e.g., Overholt Crop. Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1361 
(8th Cir. 1991); Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Va. 1995) 
(recognizing that information such as customer lists, marketing information, and 
product development information, “if disclosed to competitors, would destroy a 
company’s ability to compete”); see also Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 
A.2d 729, 734 (Pa. Super. 1995) (including “corporate information such as overhead 
costs, profit margin, dealer discounts, customer pricing, marketing strategy and 
customer contract terms” in category of non-trade secret information); Bell Fuel Corp. 
v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 460-61 (Pa. Super. 1988) (discussing customer 
information); Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Ga. 
1973); Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure Agreements to 
Silence Whistleblowers, 60 PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1229 (1999). 
 513. See, e.g., Cronimet Holdings, Inc. v. Keywell Metals, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 
3d 907, 915-16 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 514. See, e.g., id.; Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396 
(Ill. 2011). Additionally, many courts will not enforce nondisclosure clauses that 
contain no time limitation. See McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 756 
(N.D. W. Va. 2007); see also Prudential Ins. Co. Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“[T]he absence of any restriction upon the duration of the 
nondisclosure provision renders it unenforceable.”); Howard Schultz & Assoc. of the 
Se., Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 265 (Ga. 1977); Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218 
S.E.2d 68, 68 (Ga. 1975) (holding that contracts limiting the disclosure of 
“confidential” information in perpetuity are unenforceable).  
 515. See Short, supra note 512, at 1212. 
 516. Id. at 1229. 
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products, or customers.517 By contrast, courts have declined to enforce 
NDAs where there was no evidence that disclosure of the covered 
information would harm the employer’s competitive position.518 For 
instance, courts found NDAs unenforceable where the employer 
sought to protect the stability of its own workforce without respect to 
its competitors.519 The threatened disclosure need not be made to a 
                                                   
 517. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Morin, 731 S.E.2d 288, 295 (N.C. 2012); 
Shepherd v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2011) (holding that legitimate business interests that are protectable under a 
confidentiality agreement include “trade secrets and confidential information”); see 
also Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Va. 1995) (recognizing 
that information about customer lists, marketing, and product development “if 
disclosed to competitors, would destroy a company’s ability to compete”); Roberson 
v. C.P. Allen Const. Co., 50 So. 3d 471, 475 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (holding that an 
employer enjoys a protectable interest if the employee was privy to confidential 
information, secret lists, or developed close relationship with clients; additionally, 
employer’s investment in the employee can also constitute protectable interest); 
ACAS Acquisitions (Precitech) Inc. v. Hobert, 923 A.2d 1076, 1084–85 (N.H. 2007) 
(“Legitimate interests of an employer that may be protected from competition include: 
the employer’s trade secrets[;] . . . confidential information other than trade 
secrets . . . such as information regarding a unique business method; an employee’s 
special influence over the employer’s customers[;] . . . contacts developed during the 
employment; and the employer’s development of goodwill and a positive image.”). 
 518. See, e.g., Slijepcevich v. Caremark, Inc., No. 95C7286, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110, at *4 (N.D. Ill Jan. 4, 1996) (“[C]ourts will enjoin former employees only 
when there is a threat that they will disclose secret information to a competitor.”); 
Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (noting that the employer did not lose any business due to disclosures and 
considering this as a factor militating against enforcement of the nondisclosure 
agreement); Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Ga. 1973) 
(“Covenants not to disclose and utilize confidential business information are related 
to general covenants not to compete because of the similar employer interest in 
maintaining competitive advantage.”). 
 519. See, e.g., GPS Indus., LLC v. Lewis, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1334 (M.D. 
Fla. 2010) (holding the company did not have a legitimate business interest in 
protecting from use or disclosure all prospective or existing customers globally, nor 
was it able to protect all information obtained in employment); Prudential Ins. Co. 
Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 472 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding a nondisclosure 
covenant applicable to “any information whatsoever pertaining to contractholders or 
[plaintiff’s] products” as unenforceable because the information protected did not fall 
under the plaintiff’s legitimate business interests); see also Carlson Grp., Inc. v. 
Davenport, No. 16-CV-10520, 2016 WL 7212522, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2016) 
(holding that a confidentiality clause protecting all information of or concerning its 
business was unenforceable as not protecting a legitimate business interest); Trailer 
Leasing Co. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp., No. 96 C 2305, 1996 WL 392135, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 1996) (holding that “[s]ince TLC cannot possibly have a near-
permanent relationship with a prospective customer,” the confidentiality agreement 
covering all prospective customers does not address a legitimate business interest and 
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competitor in order to constitute competitive harm.520 However, courts 
enforcing NDAs based on the employer’s interest in secrecy have 
tended to do so when the employer can show that non-enforcement 
would place it “in imminent peril of suffering significant competitive 
losses.”521 Information about sexual harassment in the employer’s 
workplace does not typically harm the employer’s ability to compete 
effectively with other companies. 
Rather, the harm presented by disclosures about harassment is 
more in the nature of reputational harm or embarrassment. Case law 
explicitly addressing NDAs has not squarely addressed whether 
protection against such harms could constitute a “legitimate business 
interest.” But cases assessing the salience of such harms in other 
contexts are instructive and suggest that the bar is very high for these 
types of claims. Case law on the applicability of the confidential 
business information exemption from disclosure under the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has stressed that mere 
“embarrassment does not rise to the level of substantial competitive 
harm of the type recognized by the courts” as necessary to abrogate 
FOIA’s disclosure requirements.522 This is true even if the employer 
can show that the embarrassment attendant to the disclosure of secret 
information is anticipated to be “so severe that it could indirectly harm 
the company’s bottom line.”523 Case law on protective orders similarly 
suggests that “where embarrassment is the chief concern, the 
                                                   
is unenforceable); R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Fagan, 767 F. Supp. 1259, 1268 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding plaintiff’s noncompete and nondisclosure covenants were 
unenforceable because plaintiff did not prove that it enjoyed near-permanent customer 
relationships with its clients and thus did not have protectable, legitimate business 
interest justifying broad restraint on senior executive’s employment); 
AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 44 N.E.3d 463, 475-76 (Ill. App. Dist. 2015) 
(holding a provision that sought to protect “virtually every fact, plan, proposal, data, 
and opinion that [the employee] became aware of during the time he was employed,” 
regardless of whether it was in any way proprietary or confidential in nature as 
unenforceable); Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., P.C. v. McHugh, 28 S.W.3d 345, 348 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  
 520. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 856 F. Supp. 348, 349 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994), aff’d, 97 F.3d 1452, No. 95-1130, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322 (6th 
Cir. Sept. 12, 1996). 
 521. Uniroyal, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322 at *2. 
 522. United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 601 F.3d 557, 562 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). See also Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1998 WL 
83976, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1998) (holding that the confidential information 
covered by the agreement included presumptively public information and the parties 
reached the agreement to avoid embarrassment. Therefore, the agreement was 
invalid). 
 523. Short, supra note 512, at 1232.  
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embarrassment must be ‘particularly serious’ to suffice.”524 In this 
context—where “embarrassment”525 is an explicit ground for granting 
a protective order—the asserted harm of disclosure cannot be merely 
reputational but rather must affect the “competitive and financial 
position” of the firm.526 It will be difficult for employers to establish 
this type of interest in preventing disclosures about sexual 
harassment.527 
3. Discloser Interests 
The reasonableness of a disclosure restriction also depends on 
the strength of the discloser’s interest in revealing the contested 
information. Even if the employer can articulate a legitimate business 
interest in secrecy, the speech restrictions in an NDA cannot be “so 
large as to . . . impose undue hardship on the [employee].”528 Survivors 
who wish to disclose their harassment have strong psychological and 
health interests in doing so.529 As catalogued below, there are many 
psychological and physical harms associated with sexual 
harassment.530 Mental health professionals caution that keeping the 
experience of harassment secret is “literally toxic to [one’s] health” 
because timely treatment and care is essential for mitigating harm.531 
Survivors also have economic interests in disclosure that are 
analogous to the interests that other employees have in escaping more 
traditional employment-related NDAs barring the disclosure of trade 
secrets or confidential business information. Courts long have 
recognized that such speech restrictions can constrain an employee’s 
                                                   
 524. Glickstein, 1998 WL 83976 at *3 (refusing to grant a protective order for 
medical and financial materials produced in sexual harassment litigation to prevent 
embarrassment). 
 525. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 526. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 527. Employers may have a stronger interest in protecting the confidentiality 
of settlement terms in NDAs resolving sexual harassment claims than in protecting 
the underlying facts surrounding the harassment, because the employers’ generosity 
relative to its competitors could arguably place it at a competitive disadvantage. 
 528. Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv. Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1978), accord OVRS Acquisition Corp. v. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 
117, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Mountain Comprehensive Health Corp. v. Gibson, No. 
2013-CA-000373-MR, 2015 WL 1194508, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2015). 
 529. Nicole Spector, The Hidden Health Effects of Sexual Harassment, NBC: 
BETTER (Oct. 13, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/hidden-
health-effects-sexual-harassment-ncna810416 [https://perma.cc/5EX9-WHH3]. 
 530. See id. 
 531. Id. 
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ability to obtain and function successfully in a new job in their field.532 
For instance, it would be impossible for an automotive engineer to 
change jobs within the industry if he or she is forbidden from 
discussing any and all automotive production processes. 
Consequently, many courts have characterized employment-related 
NDAs as restraints on trade viewed with disfavor at common law 
much like covenants not to compete, and they have narrowed or 
abrogated them in order to allow employees to pursue employment 
opportunities.533  
To be sure, harassment NDAs do not restrain trade in the same 
way as traditional NDAs protecting technical or confidential business 
information. Nonetheless, the principle underlying the non-
harassment cases—that employees should not be inhibited from 
earning a living in their chosen profession—favors non-enforcement 
in cases involving sexual harassment disclosures as well. Workplace 
sexual harassment is an experience that profoundly impacts survivors’ 
professional lives, and forced silence about that experience can 
similarly impair survivors’ future employment prospects.534 “[T]he 
feelings of shame or guilt that a person may feel when sexually 
harassed at work can devastate their self-esteem and sense of self-
                                                   
 532. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 2 § 186(1) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981) 
 533. See id. (“A promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is 
unreasonably in restraint of trade.”); see also PC Connection, Inc. v. Price, No. 15-
cv-208-PB, 2015 WL 6554546, at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2015) (applying the same 
reasonableness standard to an NDA and non-compete agreements); Bodemer v. 
Swanel Beverage, 884 F. Supp. 2d 717, 733 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (predicting that the 
Indiana Supreme Court would analyze a confidentiality agreement like a covenant not 
to compete); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Whitacre, 60 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (C.D. 
Ill. 1999) (holding that under Illinois law, noncompetition 
and nondisclosure agreements are considered restrictive covenants, and therefore 
operate at least as partial restraints of trade requiring careful scrutiny by courts); Cent. 
Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D. 1996) (equating NDAs 
with covenants not to compete and applying the American Jurisprudence standard of 
reasonableness for covenants to compete to an NDA). Many courts similarly find that 
confidentiality clauses or NDAs operate as noncompete agreements. See, e.g., Fay v. 
Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 318, 323 (Ct. App. 2017), reh’g 
denied, (May 26, 2017), cert. granted, (Feb. 1, 2018) (holding a nondisclosure 
agreement to be so overbroad as to be considered a noncompete agreement). 
 534. See Hill, supra note 490; Jennifer Berdahl & Jana Raver, Sexual 
Harassment, in APA HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 
VOL. 3: MAINTAINING, EXPANDING, AND CONTRACTING THE ORGANIZATION 641 
(Sheldon Zedeck ed., 2011); see generally Afroditi Pina & Theresa A. Gannon, An 
Overview of the Literature on Antecedents, Perceptions and Behavioural 
Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 18 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 209 (2010). 
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worth as a professional.”535 Harassment may make the target doubt his 
or her own abilities or wonder if he or she was hired solely for sexual 
reasons.536 Survivors who are young or new to a field might wonder if 
this is just the way things are and if they will have to learn to live with 
the harassment if they wish to continue their employment.537 “If they 
have nothing to compare it to, they may not have an idea of what is 
normal . . . .”538 Forced silence normalizes harassment and may lead 
victims to believe that they must leave the workplace or their chosen 
field to escape it.539 This inhibits their ability to earn a living and 
restrains trade in violation of well-established public policy interests. 
Taken together, survivors’ interests in disclosure should weigh heavily 
in the “reasonableness” balance.  
4. Public Interests 
Courts have recognized that in many contexts secrecy implicates 
the public interest as well as the interests of the contracting parties.540 
Thus, courts have admonished that, in addition to balancing the 
parties’ interests, courts should ensure that NDA restrictions are not 
“so large as to interfere with the public interests.”541 Courts have found 
that the public has interests in: employees’ ability to find work in their 
chosen field;542 the free flow of information in markets;543 integrity in 
                                                   
 535. Spector, supra note 529. 
 536. See id.  
 537. See id. 
 538. Id. 
 539. See id. 
 540. See, e.g., Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv. Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
 541. Id. at 315. See Mountain Comprehensive Health Corp. v. Gibson, No. 
2013–CA–000373–MR, 2015 WL 1194508, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2015); 
OVRS Acquisition Corp. v. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 117, 126 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1995). Some courts have looked to whether or not the breadth of the restriction 
is harmful to the public good. See Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n v. Forbes, 702 
A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.H. 1997) (holding that referring physicians are not “actual 
clients” within the meaning of a non-compete and to hold as such would “not foster 
the public good”). 
 542. See Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D. 
1996). 
 543. See DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNEW, EMPLOYEE 
NONCOMPETITION LAW § 2.1 (2018). 
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corporate governance;544 exposing illegal activity;545 revelations 
implicating public health and safety;546 and a discrimination-free 
workplace.547 Disclosures of sexual harassment advance all of these 
interests. This Subsection focuses on the interests in exposing illegal 
activity and protecting public health and safety, arguing that these 
interests should inform decisions about the reasonableness of sexual 
harassment NDAs.548 
Courts have been dubious of employer attempts to conceal 
illegality via NDAs.549 Sexual harassment is illegal. As such, courts 
should be wary of employer attempts to conceal it against the wishes 
of survivors. In litigation over the tobacco company Brown & 
Williamson’s attempt to recover incriminating documents that were 
allegedly stolen from it by a former paralegal, the court explained the 
perverse incentives that would be created if employers were allowed 
to contract to conceal their illegal behavior: 
If the B&W strategy were accepted, those seeking to bury their unlawful or 
potentially unlawful acts from consumers, from other members of the 
public, and from law enforcement or regulatory authorities could achieve 
that objective by a simple yet ingenious strategy: all that would need to be 
done would be to delay or confuse any charges of health hazard, fraud, 
corruption, . . . or other misdeeds, by focusing instead on inconvenient 
documentary evidence and labelling it as the product of . . . interference 
with contracts . . . . The result would be that even the most severe public 
health and safety dangers would be subordinated . . . in the public mind to 
the malefactors’ . . . contract claims, real or fictitious.550 
                                                   
 544. See Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000–VCP, 2011 WL 941464, 
at *10 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 545. See Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1988) (refusing to enforce an agreement precluding a school board from disclosing a 
teacher’s history of pedophilia to other school districts); Terry Morehead Dworkin & 
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When is a “Source” a 
“Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 387 (1992) (observing that “[a]ll 
sources of trade secret law observe certain limitations, explicitly or implicitly 
excluding from protection information concerning wrongdoing”). 
 546. See Bowman, 542 N.E.2d at 667 (refusing to enforce an agreement 
precluding a school board from disclosing a teacher’s history of pedophilia to other 
school districts). 
 547. See Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 2002) (holding that there is significant public interest in a discrimination-
free workplace) (citing Dixon v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 541 A.2d 1046, 1063 
(1988) (O’Hern, J., concurring)). 
 548. See infra Section IV.C.IV (arguing that courts should be wary of 
employer attempts to conceal sexual harassment). 
 549. See, e.g., Bowman, 542 N.E.2d at 737. 
 550. Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 (D.D.C. 1994).  
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In addition to the general public interest against concealing 
illegal activity, the investing public has a specific interest in knowing 
what types of liability risks companies are exposed to in this domain.551 
In fact, investors have begun demanding clauses in merger agreements 
representing that executives and managers of the target firm have not 
been accused of sexual harassment, suggesting a strong investor 
interest in disclosure of harassment.552 
Not only is sexual harassment legally prohibited, but it also 
poses risks to public health and safety.553 Health and safety are 
arguably paramount in the hierarchy of public interests recognized by 
courts.554 But traditionally, sexual harassment has not been viewed as 
a public health and safety issue. Rather, it has been viewed as a private 
harm to an individual who may contract for compensation and silence 
based on his or her own personal interests.555 #MeToo has revealed 
sexual harassment to be a broader public, social, and economic harm 
by documenting the sheer pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the 
workplace and by providing compelling personal narratives 
illustrating the serious harms it causes. #MeToo vividly reinforced 
what social science research long has documented: that large numbers 
of individuals experience sexual harassment at work and that the 
perpetrators are often serial harassers whose behavior is not isolated 
to one individual.556 The numbers matter for understanding sexual 
                                                   
 551. See, e.g., EMPOWER Act, H.R. 3728, 115th Cong. (2018) (requiring 
public companies to report the number of sexual harassment cases they settled and the 
presence of employees with repeated settlements in their annual SEC filings); 
Espinoza v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 6000–VCP, 2011 WL 941464, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (finding that disclosure of a letter detailing sexual harassment allegations 
against the Hewlett-Packard CEO would “be valuable to a society concerned with 
corporate governance and integrity”). 
 552. See Nabila Ahmed, Wall Street is Adding a New ‘Weinstein Clause’ 
Before Making Deals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:29 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-01/-weinstein-clause-creeps-
into-deals-as-wary-buyers-seek-cover [https://perma.cc/3QPD-UKT6] (discussing 
that these guarantees have come to be known as “#MeToo rep[s]” or “Weinstein 
clause[s]”). 
 553. See Spector, supra note 529.  
 554. See Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality 
Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 672 (1999); see also Short, 
supra note 512, at 1212. 
 555. See MACKINNON, supra note 21. 
 556. See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON 
THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 6 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUM5-P5KL] 
(finding that in a survey of U.S. workers, 25% said that they had experienced sexual 
harassment in the workplace, 40% reported experiencing one or more behaviors that 
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harassment as a social rather than an individual problem. As one court 
opined in allowing discovery about prior sexual harassment despite an 
NDA, the public’s “concern [about sexual harassment] grows more 
pressing as additional individuals are harmed by identical or similar 
action.”557 The weight of this interest has also been suggested by recent 
commentary recommending that sexual harassment NDAs should be 
kept “in an information escrow that would be released for 
investigation by the EEOC . . . and other investigative authorities if 
another complaint is received against the same perpetrator.”558 
In addition, #MeToo stories have made salient the serious harms 
to health and safety caused by sexual harassment, which have been 
extensively documented in social science research. Researchers have 
shown that individuals who experience sexual harassment are at 
greater risk for a number of health problems, including: increased 
stress,559 depression,560 PTSD,561 and lower reported psychological 
wellbeing.562 These problems can last well beyond the time when the 
                                                   
would constitute sexual harassment, and 60% experienced insults based on their 
gender); Remus Ilies et al., Reported Incidence Rates of Work-Related Sexual 
Harassment in the United States: Using Meta-Analysis to Explain Reported Rate 
Disparities, 56 PERS. PSYCHOL. 607, 607 (2006) (conducting meta-analysis of fifty-
five studies of over 86,000 respondents find that 58% of women experienced 
harassing behaviors in the workplace); Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual 
Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the Literature 14 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 1 (2012) 
(estimating based on an overview of then-existing research that between 40–75% of 
women and 12–31% of men experience workplace sexual harassment). 
 557. Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Nev. 1993). 
 558. Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. 76, 76 
(2018). 
 559. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534. 
 560. See Jason N. Houle et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on 
Depressive Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1 SOC’Y & MENTAL 
HEALTH 89, 89 (2011) (finding significantly higher levels of depression in harassed 
vs. non-harassed workers controlling for factors like work-related stressors, 
education, and history of depression); Pina & Gannon, supra note 534; Amy E. Street 
et al., Gender Differences in Experiences of Sexual Harassment: Data From a Male-
Dominated Environment, 75 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 464, 464 (2007). 
 561. See Pina & Gannon, supra note 534; Street, supra note 560. 
 562. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 648-49; M. Sandy Hershcovis 
& Julian Barling, Comparing Victim Attributions & Outcomes for Workplace 
Aggression & Sexual Harassment, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 874, 875 (2010); Liberty 
J. Munson, Andrew G. Miner & Charles Hulin, Labeling Sexual Harassment in the 
Military: An Extension and Replication, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 293, 296 (2001); 
Morten Birkeland Nielsen et al., Sexual Harassment: Prevalence, Outcomes, and 
Gender Differences Assessed by Three Different Estimation Methods, 19 J. 
Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 252, 253 (2010); Pina & Gannon, supra note 
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harassment occurred,563 and they often manifest as physical symptoms, 
including pain, nausea, and sleep disorders.564 These harms are not 
only personally devastating to survivors but they also may require 
costly medical treatment, can negatively impact the survivor’s broader 
circle of family and co-workers, and have measurable negative 
impacts on the broader economy.565 Workers who have experienced 
harassment are less productive,566 have lower levels of organizational 
commitment567 and job satisfaction,568 and have increased turnover 
rates.569 Studies have also shown that sexual harassment has negative 
consequences for bystander witnesses to harassment, who report 
negative job, health, and psychological outcomes that mirror those 
experienced by harassment targets.570  
While the harms of sexual harassment are substantial, they are 
not always immediately recognized and often remain latent and 
unaddressed for some period of time, exacerbating the associated 
health risks.571 Studies have documented that many victims of 
behaviors that fit the legal definition of sexual harassment do not 
identify their experiences as harassment.572 However, it has been 
                                                   
534, at 221 (finding that harassment survivors are at greater risk of experiencing 
anger, fear, sadness, humiliation, and mistrust); Street, supra note 560, at 465. 
 563. See generally Houle et al., supra note 560 (finding that early career 
sexual harassment has long-term effects on depressive symptoms later in life). 
 564. See Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 221; Spector, supra note 531. 
Anecdotally, it has been reported that harassed “[e]mployees talk of having a pit in 
their stomach commuting to work, having anxiety, panic attacks, inexplicable fits of 
crying and physical manifestations of stress: hair falling out, hives, weight gain or 
loss, sleeplessness and lethargy.” Id.  
 565. See infra notes 566-569. 
 566. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 649; Pina & Gannon, supra note 
534, at 220. 
 567. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 649; Munson, Minor, & Hulin, 
supra note 562, at 296; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 220 (finding that less 
attachment to the employer organization leads to costly work withdrawal behaviors, 
including being late, neglectful, and avoiding work tasks).  
 568. See Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 562, at 874; Nielsen et al., supra 
note 562, at 254; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 220.  
 569. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 649; Hershcovis & Barling, 
supra note 562, at 886; Pina & Gannon, supra note 534, at 220.  
 570. See Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 650; Pina & Gannon, supra note 
534, at 221. 
 571. See infra notes 572-575. 
 572. See Ilies et al., supra note 556, at 623-24 (finding that less than half of 
women who reported experiencing harassing behaviors labeled their experience as 
harassment); Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, The 
Economic and Career Effects of Sexual Harassment on Working Women, 31 GENDER 
& SOC’Y 333, 345 (2017) (finding that less than one third of both men and women 
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shown that discussion about incidents of harassment with co-workers, 
friends, and family can help individuals recognize their own 
experiences as harassment and seek help.573 Critically, failing to 
recognize sexual harassment does not insulate victims from the harms 
associated with it.574 Those harms have been found to affect 
individuals even if they do not label the harassing behavior they 
experienced as “sexual harassment.”575 This latent quality exacerbates 
the potential harms of harassment and heightens the public interest in 
open and honest dialogue about it. 
In addition to social science research documenting the 
pervasiveness and the harm of sexual harassment, various state and 
federal statutes provide evidence of the growing consensus that there 
is a strong public interest in disclosing sexual harassment.576 Section 
178 of the Second Restatement of Contracts indicates that in deciding 
whether a contract violates public policy, courts should consider, 
among other factors, “the strength of [the] policy as manifested by 
legislation or judicial decisions.”577 While courts do not need statutory 
authority to invoke the public policy exception to NDA enforceability 
and may rely solely on adverse third-parties impacts, statutory labor 
law, open records laws, whistleblower protection laws, and the 
cascade of legislative activity in the wake of #MeToo provide 
persuasive evidence of the public interest in bringing harassment to 
light.578 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has long been held 
to forbid employers’ use of NDAs to prevent employees from 
discussing workplace sexual harassment with one another on the 
grounds that this would violate the act’s protections of employees’ 
right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or 
                                                   
who experienced harassing behaviors labeled their experience as harassment); 
Munson, Minor & Hulin, supra note 562, at 294. 
 573. See McLaughlin, Uggen & Blackstone, supra note 572, at 337. 
 574. See Munson, Minor, & Hulin, supra note 562, at 300-01. 
 575. Id. at 293, 300-01.  
 576. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, § 178 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981). 
 577. Id. 
 578. See Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 663 (Ohio Ct. App.) 
(refusing to enforce an agreement precluding a school board from disclosing a 
teacher’s history of pedophilia to other school districts despite lack of clear statutory 
authority to do so); Ryan M. Philp, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and 
Secrecy in Non-Disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 845, 860, 876 (2003) 
(arguing that legislation is not definitive but can serve “as a judicial guidepost”); 
Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 
74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1956-60 (1996). 
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protection.579 State open records statutes have provided grounds for 
some state courts to invalidate NDAs shielding sexual harassment 
claims settled by government entities.580 Most states have enacted 
statutes affording whistleblowers protection “to expose, deter, and 
curtail wrongdoing.”581 These could support non-enforcement of 
NDAs used to conceal employer wrongdoing.  
Finally, in the wake of #MeToo, there has been a wave of 
legislative activity explicitly addressing sexual harassment NDAs.582 
New York and Washington have enacted legislation limiting the use 
of NDAs to conceal harassment or other types of sexual assault.583 
                                                   
 579. See Phoenix Transit Sys. & Amalgamated Transit Union, Case 28-CA-
15177, 337 NLRB No. 78 (N.L.R.B 2002) (ordering employer to cease and desist 
from “[m]aintaining or enforcing a rule which prohibits employees from discussing 
among themselves their sexual harassment complaints” based on their rights under 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act to engage in concerted activities for the 
purpose of mutual aid or protection). 
 580. See Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 944 P.2d 646, 649-51 (Colo. 
App. 1997) (concluding based on the existence of state open records laws that the 
provisions of a settlement agreement “prohibiting discussion or disclosure of the 
circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s resignation and prohibiting disparaging 
comments or remarks are void as a violation of public policy”; overturned on the 
grounds there was no statutory directive guiding that decision); Asbury Park Press v. 
Cty. of Monmouth, 966 A.2d 75, 75, 79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (reversing 
the trial court and ordering the County to disclose documentation of a sexual 
harassment settlement with one of its employees to journalists despite a confidentiality 
agreement: “The trial court found it significant that [the harassment victim] and the 
County included terms of confidentiality in their settlement agreement. But the 
parties’ agreement cannot override the public’s right of access under OPRA.”).  
 581. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000) (discussing that in 2000, 
all fifty states had whistleblower protection statutes; in 2010, some states had removed 
these statutes); 2012 Whistleblowing Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/2012-whistleblower-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/QW4B-TEXB]. 
 582. See, e.g., S.B. S6382A (N.Y. 2018); S.B. 5996 (Wash. 2018); CAL. CODE 
OF CIV. P. § 1002 (2017). 
 583. See S.B. S6382A (N.Y. 2018) (prohibits nondisclosure clauses in any 
settlement, agreement or other resolution of a claim or cause of action, the factual 
foundation for which involves sexual harassment unless the agreement expressly 
states that it is the complainant’s preference to include such a confidentiality 
provision); S.B. 5996 (Wash. 2018) (prohibits employers from requiring employees 
to sign, as a condition of employment, a NDA preventing them from “disclosing or 
discussing sexual harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace, at work-
related events coordinated by or through the employer, or between employees, or 
between an employer and an employee, off the employment premises” and provides 
that such agreements—including nondisclosure agreements that predate the new 
law—will be void and unenforceable); see also CAL. CODE OF CIV. P. § 1002 (2017) 
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Similar legislation has been introduced in Kansas, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania.584 A bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced the 
EMPOWER Act, which would prohibit NDAs covering sexual 
harassment as “a condition of employment, promotion, compensation, 
benefits or change in employment status”585 and render such existing 
NDAs unenforceable.586 This groundswell of legislative activity, 
viewed against the backdrop of state statutes providing more 
generalized protections for employees and whistleblowers, provides 
strong evidence of a public interest in disclosure. 
That said, there are public interests in secrecy that should be 
considered as well. Many survivors of harassment prefer 
confidentiality to public disclosure.587 As one member of the 
employment defense bar put it, “With the possible exception of Gloria 
Allred, almost nobody wants attention to be drawn to a sexual 
harassment case”—including survivors.588 This means that there is a 
public interest in maintaining the option for survivors to negotiate for 
enforceable confidentiality provisions in agreements settling 
harassment claims. Some have argued that finding sexual harassment 
NDAs unenforceable would make them unavailable to the many 
survivors who want them because employers and accused harassers 
would either refuse to settle harassment claims or would not be willing 
to pay significant compensation to a survivor to settle claims that 
could later be made public with impunity.589 These are serious 
concerns. However, it is not clear that abrogating NDAs to permit 
public disclosures by the small handful of survivors who decide to go 
public after signing an NDA would radically alter settlement practices 
by employers and employees in run-of-the-mill cases. As discussed 
above, such disclosures are already permitted in court, to regulatory 
                                                   
(prohibiting non-disclosure provisions in cases involving a felony sex offense, 
childhood sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of a minor, and sexual assault). 
 584. H.B. 2695 (Kan. 2018) (prohibiting state funds distribution to pay sexual 
harassment claims and prohibiting non-disclosure agreements for sexual harassment 
settlements in “certain circumstances”); S.B. No. 121 (N.J. 2018) (barring agreements 
that conceal details of discrimination claims); S.B. No. 999 (Pa. 2018) (prohibiting 
NDAs within contracts or secret out-of-court settlements related to sexual harassment 
or misconduct). 
 585. EMPOWER Act, S. 2994 (a)(1) 115TH Cong. (2018). 
 586. See EMPOWER Act, § (a)(2). 
 587. See Robin Shea, In Defense of Confidentiality (Yes, Even In Harassment 
Cases), CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.constangy.com/employment-labor-insider/ban-confidentiality-in-sex-
harassment-settlements-youll [https://perma.cc/9RKF-WZ4R]. 
 588. Id.  
 589. See id. 
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agencies, and to fellow employees.590 Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence that these broad exceptions have inhibited employers’ use of 
sexual harassment NDAs.591 The continued availability of NDAs to 
those survivors who want them is an empirical question that can only 
be answered in time as law and practices evolve in response to 
changing norms. The ability of survivors to negotiate meaningfully for 
confidentiality is an interest that courts should consider as these cases 
come before them. 
D. The “Reasonableness” Standard as a Reasonable Way Forward 
As indicated above, rather than wait for common law standards 
governing sexual harassment NDAs to develop, some states are 
proceeding with legislation to enact categorical rules that presumably 
reflect the legislature’s view of the appropriate balance of employer, 
employee, and public interests. For instance, New York’s recently 
enacted statute prohibits nondisclosure clauses in any settlement, 
agreement, or other resolution of a claim or cause of action, “the 
factual foundation for which involves sexual harassment,” unless the 
agreement expressly states that it is the “complainant’s preference” to 
include such a confidentiality provision.592 Washington state’s 
proposed legislation prohibits employers from requiring employees to 
sign sexual harassment NDAs as a condition of employment, but it 
allows employers and employees to negotiate confidentiality 
provisions as a part of settlement agreements.593  
Even if such statutes embody sound policy, they do not diminish 
the importance of the common law’s case-by-case approach to 
reasonableness assessments. First, most states have not enacted 
statutes addressing sexual harassment NDAs. The common law is the 
only avenue for addressing them in these jurisdictions. Second, even 
in states with statutes governing sexual harassment NDAs, questions 
are likely to arise over whether agreements reached in compliance 
with the statute are nonetheless unreasonable. For instance, 
Washington’s statute permits NDAs reached as part of settlement 
agreements, and these might be unreasonable under common law 
                                                   
 590. See supra Subsections IV.B.-C. 
 591. See Ayres, supra note 558, at 85 (suggesting that employers continue to 
draft NDAs that prohibit lawful disclosures and arguing that sexual harassment NDAs 
should only be enforceable if they explicitly disclose the rights that survivors retain 
to report the perpetrator’s behavior to the EEOC and other investigative authorities). 
 592. S.B. S6382A (N.Y. 2018). 
 593. See S. 5996, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
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standards in some circumstances.594 Similarly, some have argued that 
New York’s requirement that an NDA be the “complainant’s 
preference” swallows the statute’s prohibition on NDAs because 
employers will refuse to settle claims without including a boilerplate 
“complainant’s preference” clause.595 Nominally compliant NDAs in 
which signers are forced to assert an affirmative preference for 
confidentiality might well be unreasonable under common law 
standards.596 Finally, this is an area where norms, standards, and 
practices are evolving rapidly; the social ground is shifting beneath 
our collective feet. The appeal of the “reasonableness” analysis 
described in this section is that it allows for a different balance to be 
struck under different factual circumstances and for enforceability 
standards to evolve with norms and practices.  
CONCLUSION 
Polling data suggests that judges may soon face an avalanche of 
opportunities to reflect on the impact of the norm cascade on the law: 
38% of Americans in a recent Gallup poll said that recent events have 
made them more likely to sue.597 Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers and 
human resources professionals report being deluged with sexual 
harassment complaints.598 An NBC–Wall Street Journal poll found 
that 78% of women are now more likely to speak out if they feel they 
are being treated unfairly due to their gender, and 77% of men say they 
                                                   
 594. See Wash. S.B. 5996 (2018). 
 595. John L. Valentino, Will N.Y. Law Banning Non-Disclosure Agreements 
Eliminate Their Use?, BOUSQUET HOLSTEIN, PLLC (Aug. 16, 2018),  
http://bhlawpllc.com/publication/will-n-y-law-banning-non-disclosure-agreements-
eliminate-their-use/ [https://perma.cc/2N47-S463]. 
 596. See generally id. Indeed, it is particularly important for courts to police 
the reasonableness of such NDAs, as employers are likely to point to “complainant’s 
preference” clauses as evidence that an agreement is presumptively valid even if they 
do not meaningfully reflect the complainant’s preferences. Id. 
 597. Saad, supra note 63. 
 598. See Amelia Gentleman & Joanna Walters, #MeToo is Raising Awareness, 
But Taking Sexual Abuse to Court is a Minefield, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 7:06 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/metoo-is-raising-awareness-but-
taking-sexual-abuse-to-court-is-a-minefield [https://perma.cc/AV24-C22Y]; see also 
Yuki Noguchi, #MeToo Complaints Swamp Human Resources Departments, NPR 
(June 4, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/04/615783454/-metoo-
complaints-swamp-human-resource-departments [https://perma.cc/CBS6-45QY]; 
Maya Rhodan, #MeToo Has ‘Tripled’ Web Traffic for the Federal Agency That 
Investigates Harassment, TIME (June 12, 2018), http://time.com/5308836/sexual-
harassment-metoo-eeoc-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/CHE4-UBGD]. 
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are more likely to speak out now if they see a woman being unfairly 
treated for the same reason.599 Perhaps more radically, women who 
experience sexual harassment are now much more likely to recognize 
it as such.600  
This dramatic change in norms around sexual harassment has 
occurred in a very short period of time. Courts must take these new 
norms into account in deciding sexual harassment cases today. These 
new norms define what it means to be a “reasonable jury” or a 
                                                   
 599. Carrie Dann, NBC/WSJ Poll: Nearly Half of Working Women Say 
They’ve Experienced Harassment, NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017, 7:00 AM) 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/nbc-wsj-poll-nearly-half-working-
women-say-they-ve-n815376 [https://perma.cc/4USY-6PCG]. 
 600. See, e.g., CHAI FELDBLUM & VICTORIA LIPNIC, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS 
OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 8-10 
(2016) (describing shifts in public perception regarding sexual harassment). 
Historically, polling questions that asked if respondents had experienced specific 
behaviors (behavioral questions) found sharply higher levels of sexual harassment 
than did polling questions that asked simply whether the respondent had experienced 
sexual harassment (direct inquiries). See, e.g., Berdahl & Raver, supra note 534, at 
642-43. Today, that gap has largely closed, with roughly 60% of women now 
reporting sexual harassment in direct-inquiry polling. FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 
600, at 9. By comparing rates of harassment measured through direct-inquiry and 
behavioral questions, research has repeatedly shown that only half of all women who 
have been sexually harassed identify their experiences as “sexual harassment.” See 
Iles et al., supra note 556, at 607. One meta-analysis of fifty-five studies including 
over 86,000 respondents found that 58% of women had experienced behaviors that 
qualified as harassment, but less than half of these women were willing to label them 
as such. Id. This trend is particularly well exemplified in an extensive report released 
by an EEOC task force in June 2016. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 600, at 8-
10. According to the report, when asked directly (in surveys) if they had experienced 
sexual harassment, only 25% of women said yes. Id. When respondents were given a 
list of behaviors considered harassing by researchers and asked what they had 
personally experienced within a given time frame, the rate of harassment rose to 40%. 
Id. at 8-9. When including questions related to gender harassment (i.e. sex-based put 
downs rather than come-ons) the rate rose to 60% of women. Id. at 9. According to 
polls conducted post the explosion of the #MeToo movement, now between 42–60% 
of women report being sexually harassed when asked directly, a dramatic shift from 
only 25% in 2016. See, e.g., 60% of U.S. Women Say They’ve Been Sexually Harassed 
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Trump Job Approval Still Stuck Below 
40%, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. (2017), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-
detail?ReleaseID=2502 [https://perma.cc/9JVJ-96WN]. Given that the rate of 
workplace sexual harassment has remained relatively stable over time, the dramatic 
increase in the number of women who say they have been sexually harassed is most 
likely due to a shift in perception; the #MeToo movement has changed the way 
women view their workplace interactions and has led many to newly label what they 
have long experienced as “sexual harassment.” See Iles et al., supra note 556, at 625 
(finding generally that rates of workplace sexual harassment have remained constant 
over time). 
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“reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” They define what 
information an employer may “reasonably” ask an employee to 
conceal about sexual harassment. In short, they define what’s 
“reasonable” now.  
Our request is modest: Let juries play their proper role in 
applying the “reasonableness” standards. These standards are 
designed to allow juries “to make commonsense determinations about 
human behavior, reasonableness, and state of mind based on objective 
standards.”601 They are meant to ensure that sexual harassment law is 
informed by community standards of appropriate behavior in the 
workplace.602 Federal judges should allow juries to do the difficult 
work of grappling with facts and establishing norms about what 
conduct is considered appropriate in the age of #MeToo. If the polls 
are any indication, most of us already know. 
                                                   
 601. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and 
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 NYU L. REV. 982, 1134 (2003). 
 602. See Beiner 1999, supra note 126, at 82.  
